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ABSTRACT
Environmental concerns have, gradually and
precariously, become integrated into the American
policymaking process.

Recognized as an essential aspect of

human quality of life, environmental policy receives ever
increasing attention from American policymakers.

Owing to

developments such as the passage of the Clean Air Act and
the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, the significance of addressing environmental
challenges has garnered both domestic and international
attention.

In providing guidance for American environmental

policies, American presidents function as vital arbiters in
the shaping of domestic and international environmental
policies.

Herein lies the necessity for addressing

environmental policymaking crafted within the parameters of
American presidential power.
Although environmental policy outcomes are influenced
by nonenvironmental policy calculations, policy
transformations over the last three decades warrant
investigating environmental policy formation as a distinct
field.

Public, presidential, and other policymaking factors

reveal how crucial presidential power is in the
determination of environmental policy outcomes.

President

George Bush demonstrated how vital presidential power is in
the determination of such policy outcomes.
iii

His use of

presidential power can be properly viewed as the decisive
factor in the policy fulfillment of the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments and the treaty obligations the United States
consented to at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development(UNCED).

The 1990 Clean Air Act

amendments required presidential execution of new emission
mandates in order to achieve tougher clean air standards.
The 1992 UNCED treaty obligations depended upon presidential
leadership to meet domestic and international treaty g o a l s .
President Bush's policy calculations decided the policy
outcomes in both of these environmental policy areas.
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INTRODUCTION

The environm ent has becom e a public policy issue that receives its own
distinct recognition within the A m erican political spectrum .

This recognition has

included direct discussion and action from policym akers over the last four decades.1
F or example, the first "environm ental decade" was initiated in 1970 with the aim of
protecting A m erica’s air, w ater, and other natural resources, a grand idea that took
legislative form with the National Environm ental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
President Richard N ixon achieved a political landm ark when he signed the 1970 Clean
A ir Act into law. One o f the m ost significant popular m ovem ents in American
history transform ed the environm ent into a issue-specific legislation and a fundamental
political and social issue. Since the launching o f the Clean A ir A ct, the tide of public
opinion favoring enhanced environm ental protection has gained conviction and support
from both societal m ores and from scientific evidence. This scientific evidence has
indicated man-m ade alterations to global life support systems has accelerated environ
mental degradation and in the end basic quality o f life questions.
Public attention is focused on the environm ent, but such attention begs the
question of the environm ent’s ow n significance. Popular passions change and are an
awkward indicator o f an issue’s true import. Environm ental policy has played a
m ajor, perhaps not pivotal, role in national politics before its dram atic resurgence
during the 1960s.2 The prom inence o f environm ental concerns has shaped different

symbols and policies throughout Am erican history. This range o f symbols and
policies has included the New D eal’s Civilian Conservation C orps to Theodore
R oosevelt’s conservation agenda, as part of the Progressive Era.-' This historical
reality dem onstrates the environm ent has, in fact, played a role in our political arena
w ithin the last century. But the environm ent has been a constant and encom passing
force in all hum an affairs throughout history. Thus there exists the necessity o f
studying the environm ent and how humans have approached and interacted with the
environm ent.
How the A m erican public and its officials form ulate environm ental policy
rem ains a com pelling issue. W hat relationship does the governm ent establish toward
the environm ent? How ought the governm ent create environm ental public policy?
W hich branch o f the federal governm ent should direct the developm ent o f environ
mental policy? A nsw ers to these questions are not autom atic nor final. A myriad o f
prescriptions addressing these challenging questions and other sim ilar questions put
forth by the literature are both debated and cham pioned, especially in light o f basic
pro and con concerns about protection and use o f the environm ent and natural
resources. One such policy approach will suffice to dem onstrate how elusive and
difficult finding answ ers can be: Vice-President A1 G ore, writing on the environm en
tal issue, states:
Every education is a kind o f inward journey, and
my study o f the global environm ent has required a
searching re-exam ination of the ways in which
political m otives and governm ent policies have
helped to create the crisis and now frustrate the
solutions we need. Ecology is the study o f bal-
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ance, and some o f the same principles that govern
the healthy balance o f elem ents in the global
environm ent also apply to the healthy balances o f
forces m aking up our political system . In my
view , how ever, our system is on the verge o f
losing its essential equilibrium . The problem is
not so m uch one o f policy failures: m uch m ore
w orrisom e are the failures o f candor, evasions o f
responsibility, and tim idity o f vision that charac
terize too many o f us in governm ent. M ore than
anything else my study o f the environm ent has led
me to realize the extent to which our current
public discourse is focused on the shortest of
short-term values and encourages the Am erican
people to join us politicians in avoiding the most
im portant issues and postponing the really diffi
cult choices.4
The inherent difficulty in assessing and form ulating environm ental policy is not
necessarily cause for austere cynicism . Rather environm ental policy must be analyzed
and evaluated on both practical and reasonable term s. This can be accomplished with
a treatm ent o f public policym aking in the governm ent. At what level of governm ent
can this treatm ent be best executed? And how can it be explained?
A vast array o f governm ental levels could be utilized for such an endeavor.
Local, state, interstate, national and international levels o f governm ent

affect environ

mental policy. All these levels could be utilized; but, for the purposes of project
m anageability, the national level o f governm ent, as the historical leader in environ
mental policy, will be em phasized.
W hat part or branch o f the national governm ent would be best suited for this
purpose?

The legislative, executive, and judiciary branches all interact and overlap

in many public policy areas, and the environm ental arena is no exception. The
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executive branch will serve as the fulcrum for analyzing environm ental policy in this
undertaking.

There are a few good reasons for selecting the executive branch. To

begin with, the public itself and institutions throughout society view the President as
the symbolic and actual leader on leading policy issues. Many legislative or policy
initiatives m ust originate from the President. Furtherm ore, the President possesses
the power and authority to secure policy efficacy. Thus it may be argued the success
o f national environm ental policy prim arily rests with the President. Finally, national
environm ental policy feedback and outcom es are necessarily channeled through the
presidency through m echanism s like public opinion or legislative checks and balances.
The recent developm ents o f the last few decades illustrate how pivotal the
presidency has been in shaping public policy on the environm ent. D uring the 1970s
the Executive’s adoption o f m ajor environm ental and resource policies, such as the
founding o f new institutions, the m ost notable o f which is the Environm ental Protec
tion Agency (EPA ), provide evidence why this is true. Policy decisions, such as the
m anagem ent o f environm ental program s and the spending levels o f these program s,
are significantly influenced by presidential policym aking. Despite, for exam ple, the
Reagan adm inistration’s attem pts throughout the 1980s to curtail environm ental
program s, they continued to survive, not only because of congressional support, but
also because o f the courts and public opinion.5
It is safe to say that despite some executive efforts o f the twelve previous
years, environm ental institutions, program s and advances will not be reversed.
H ow ever, this trend does not deny that the 1990s will be different from the 1970s or
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1980s.

If continuity in environm ental policies is to be m aintained or enhanced over

the next decade, environm ental policies will require careful attention and in many
cases creative investigation for m ore effective and efficient approaches.

Important

changes in the 1990s also can be expected in the kinds o f ongoing and possible
different environm ental problem s that will make their way onto governm ental agendas
and in the political responses to them .6
The political responses to evolving environm ental challenges are vital to
understanding how these challenges will be addressed and possibly solved.

For

exam ple, when presidential action m oves an environm ental problem onto the govern
mental agenda, what kind o f policy outcom e can be anticipated? W ould the political
calculus betw een the president, C ongress, the courts, local governm ents, interest
groups, public opinion, and other political actors jeopardize the environm ental goals
sought in approved environm ental legislation or approved environm ental treaties? In
other w ords, when the president and other political actors agree upon environm ental
policy goals will such goals survive the political process that created them to begin
with? In the 1990s can such environm ental policy ends be reconciled with the
vicissitudes and vagaries o f presidential political reality? If presidential policymaking
results in either an abandonm ent or indecision in how to achieve such goals what kind
o f policy outcom es would result? Finally, would such abandonm ent or indecision
generate across-the-board setbacks for a president in that both environm ental policy
goals and prom ises are not sought and kept, and that the perceived political gains
from such policy reversals are not actually secured? W ithin the param eters of the

case areas investigated, this project aims to address the questions posed and provide
some answ ers to these questions.

CHAPTER I

SELECTING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A N D
ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING
A diverse and im pressive range o f theoretical fram ew orks exist for analyzing
and evaluating presidential pow er and policym aking.

D ifferent fram ew orks employ a

macro approach, a m icro approach or a com bination o f both for such a task. The
macro approach em phasizes the office o f the President. T he office itself and its
concom itant pow ers are the focus o f explanation for presidential action. The m icro
approach stresses the individual who holds the W hite House as the key determ inant for
explaining presidential actions. The main concern centers on the personality and
psychology o f the individual in power.
A com bination o f these approaches provides increased depth and breadth in the
assessm ent o f presidential policym aking. The challenge now becomes which m acro
approach to select for evaluating presidential policym aking within the environm ental
field.
Five m acro perspectives on the presidency w ere scrutinized. These five
fram ew orks included the obligations perspective, the constraints perspective, the
statecraft tradition, the anti-aggrandizem ent perspective and the roles perspective.
Each o f these categories will be individually discussed.
The obligations approach posits the presidency as vital for policy form ation on
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national issues. This school o f thought identifies an issue (like the environm ent),
defines it as falling unequivocally within presidential responsibility, highlights
instances o f presidential dereliction, and exhorts current and future occupants o f the
office to action. Often the presidency is chosen as the necessary source o f action
because the other institutions o f governm ent at the national, state, and local levels are
assertedly unwilling or incapable o f adequate response.
One exam ple o f this sentim ent is expressed by Richard Longaker:
W ise and persistent use o f the instrum ents o f the
presidency - the appointing pow er, the selective
and vigorous use o f law enforcem ent, and the
cum ulative advances by means o f the im aginative
application o f adm inistrative discretion, to name
only a few , can nourish freedom even in the face
o f C old W ar pressures. Executive neglect, on the
other hand, may lead to the underm ining o f the
very substance o f Am erican Constitutionalism .
W hat must be recognized today is that sustained
leadership in the field must originate in W hite
House direction, coordination, and sensitivity.
Because the m ajor problem s will find their way to
the W hite H ouse, to be dealt with or neglected,
here in particular there should be individuals who
speak o f liberty rather than security and who feel
com m itted to a positive role for the Federal exec
utive . . . 7

The obligations approach places considerable im portance on the actions o f the
president. The president is elevated to catalyst o f both conventional responsibilities
and virtuous example.
The obligations approach features a dual pitfall. The first problem rests with
the assum ption that presidential activity can be anything other than beneficial and

hum ane. Both history and hum an nature challenge this assum ption. W hile supporters
o f the obligations approach are not oblivious to human shortcom ings and empirical
patterns, their view o f presidential pow er is to capitalize on opportunities to use it.
The obligationists do not delineate clear criteria between the use and abuse o f
presidential power - the President is m erely obligated to use it. Not surprisingly,
events such as Vietnam and W atergate tem pered the enthusiasm for extending
presidential obligations into new dim ensions o f public policy.
Closely related to the first problem is the obligationist w riter’s tendency to
construct prescriptions for presidential action without sufficiently addressing potential
repercussions from the adoption o f their ideas. Likewise, they generally do not
highlight political advantages that could be gained from fulfilling recom mended
obligations. The obligationist project thus renders itself hortatory and academ ic in its
effects on the president. These two factors indicate why the obligations approach
would be limited as a fram ew ork for assessing and evaluating environm ental policym 
aking. The proponents o f this fram ew ork exhort at the expense o f realistic policy
actions.
The constraints perspective adopts a notably different line. The constraintist
w riters see the presidency as a vehicle for frustration and policy failure. This
approach stems from John F .K ennedy’s experience as an activist president who
proclaim ed extensive responsibilities for his office. The inability to fulfill these selfproclaim ed responsibilities cast the presidency in a shadow of doubt as an agent for
policy transform ation. C ertainly there is an inclination among those who served in
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K ennedy’s adm inistration to blam e his disappointm ents on the constraints surrounding
the presidency and the president’s lack o f pow er to overcom e them.
These notions are expressed in works by Schlesinger, Sorenson and Hilsm an.
H ilsm an invokes President T rum an’s fam ous com m ent he m ade when he reflected
upon turning the presidency over to Eisenhower: "H e’ll sit here and he’ll say, ’Do
this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it w on’t be a bit like the A rm y."
Hilsm an expounds upon this observation:
In the field o f foreign affairs, the President’s
pow er is imm ense. His is the m onopoly in deal
ing with other states. But he, too, must build a
consensus for his policy if it is to succeed. He
m ust bring along enough o f the different factions
in Congress to forestall revolt, and he must con
tend for the support o f w ider constituencies, the
press, interest groups, and ’attentive publics.’
Even within the Executive Branch itself, his
policy will not succeed m erely at his command,
and he must build cooperation and support, obtain
approval from some acquiescence from others,
and enthusiasm from enough to carry it to com 
pletion.8
A couple o f flaws rest with the constraints approach. The theory relies too
heavily on the experiences o f one adm inistration. W hat was true for the Kennedy
A dm inistration may not be true for other presidencies or future presidencies. The
constraints perspective is too narrow for explaining executive policy.
The other problem centers on the assum ptions made by constraintist writers.
The label o f this approach autom atically indicates which direction policy execution
will take. In other w ords, presum ption rests with policy failure or circum vention.
The presidency continually struggles with other branches and institutions for fulfilling
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distinct policy ends.

Furtherm ore, the ability of the W hite House to accom plish its

policy goals is lim ited.
The third theoretical category can be appropriately labeled the statecraft
approach. This school o f thought traces its roots back to M achiavelli.

Prom inent

statecraft w riters such as Richard N eustadt openly proclaim they w rite in the tradition
o f M achiavelli. This tradition relies on a hard-headed devotion to the realities of
power.
Richard N eustadt’s Presidential Pow er embodies many o f the characteristics of
the sobering statecraft account o f presidential power. Presidential Pow er outlines key
aspects for explaining presidential pow er: The president wields overw helm ing
responsibilities; his powers are notably lim ited; the individual and psychological views
o f the occupant are significant; and finally, presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt
with an activist realization o f the office are preferable to passive occupants such as
Dw ight D. Eisenhow er.

Neustadt does not prescribe structural o r institutional

changes in the office. Rather, his work is a manual exhorting the President how to
m axim ize the pow ers already within his realm.
Neustadt explains how these elem ents constitute his statecraft theme in the
book:
The President rem ains our system ’s Great Initia
tor. W hen what we once called ’w ar’ impends,
he now becomes our system ’s Final Arbiter. He
is no less a clerk in one capacity than in the
other. But in the second instance those he serves
are utterly dependent on his judgem ent, and judg
em ent then becomes the m ark o f ’leadership.’
Com m and may have a narrow reach but it encom-
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passes irreparable consequences. Yet persuasion
is required to exercise com m and, to get one’s
hand upon subordinate decisions. W ith this so
nearly absolute dependence upon presidential
judgem ent backed by presidential skill, we and
our system have no previous e x p erien ce...9
H opefully, both citizens and presidents will approach presidential power
without fear or histrionics or withdrawals from reality or lurches toward aggression.
Regardless o f the dangers, presidential pow er, even in this new dim ension, still has to
be sought and used.
The statecraft approach does feature distinct m erits in the assessm ent o f
presidential pow er and its relation to policy m aking. The statecraft fram ew ork could
provide useful guides to an ambitious individual for achieving policy ends regardless
o f what m eans are em ployed. This em phasis on one individuals’s political skills does
place less em phasis on the form al, constitutional powers o f the executive in relation to
the inform al, extra-legal aspects of presidential pow er. This approach does not
provide significant explanatory powers for assessing power and its relation to policy if
the individual office holder does not exude his political skills in a given policy area.
Such is the case w hen it comes to President Bush securing environm ental policy aims.
For this reason the statecraft fram ework was not adopted for the project.
The next theoretical fram ework considered can be conveniently labeled the
anti-aggrandizem ent approach. This genre within presidential literature views
executive pow er itself with suspicion. A nti-aggrandizem ent writers espouse a faith in
the C onstitution’s rendition of the balance and separation of powers between the
branches. Thus any trend or arrangem ent that results in increased powers for the
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executive branch is viewed with trepidation.
A nti-aggrandizem ent writers acknowledge the evolving and challenging
problem s the United States faces dom estically and internationally. But these new and
com plex problem s do not w arrant the increase in the expanse and num ber o f presiden
tial roles - especially at the expense o f the legislative branch.
Edw in C orw in in his seminal w ork, The President: Office and Pow ers,
observes what this phenomena entails: " ...a long-term trend at work in the world that
consolidates pow er in the executive departm ent o f all governm ents". Thus there
exists the possibility o f an overreaching executive that encroaches upon the personal
and private rights o f the citizens. Each president may differ in term s o f institutional
excesses and abuse o f presidential pow er, but the momentum to the institutionalization
o f the office is increasingly inevitable unless constitutional and organizational changes
are purposely instituted to check presidential pow er.

For exam ple, C orw in advocates

that the presidential cabinet be constructed from a joint Legislative Council including
influential m em bers o f Congress.
The anti-aggrandizem ent authors seek to lim it executive discretion in achieving
policy goals. This political prescription could unnecessarily hinder executive latitude
in m eeting crises or fulfilling an am bitious policy agenda. The environm ent is such a
policy area where such latitude could be essential.

Furtherm ore, the anti-aggrandize

ment approach is a prescriptive attem pt to form ally limit the powers o f the president.
This kind o f theoretical recom m endation may be well-intentioned but does not address
the reality o f the contem porary Am erican executive who possesses an unprecedented
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degree o f policy discretion despite congressional and public efforts to contain such
discretion. President Bush has proved to be no exception to this presidential pattern
when it came to underm ining the very same environm ental policy goals he previously
supported.

O f all the theoretical fram ew orks investigated, the roles approach featured the
most net benefits. W hile the roles approach is not flawless, it features few er disad
vantages for explaining and evaluating presidential power and policym aking.

In a

nutshell, the roles approach is best suited for the purposes o f this work.
First, the roles fram ew ork is the m ost prevalent and academ ically respected
way o f viewing the presidency.10 This recognition does not necessarily fiat theoreti
cal superiority, but it does indicate the roles view possesses resilience and flexibility
the other fram ew orks might lack. M oreover, a community of like m inded scholars
would not rely upon or recognize this fram ew ork so consistently. It could actually be
labelled the received view o f the office.
Second, depending upon the author, presidential roles are arrayed in a range
from those provided in the C onstitution, such as C hief Executive, to those which
devolved upon the office like C hief D iplom at or W orld Leader or were granted as
part o f the political socialization process, such as party leader or public opinion
leader.
Clinton R ossiter’s widely known text, The American President, developed ten
such roles for the president, including those of C hief Executive and W orld Leader.

A nother author, Thom as A. Bailey, created an astounding forty-three roles for the
president in his work on presidential significance. Bailey designed each role to
m easure both presidential greatness and to serve as a com pendium on presidential
responsibility. C ontem porary authors such as Byron Daynes and Ray Tatalovich
employ five roles in their investigations of m odern presidential pow er. This diverse
array in the num ber o f roles that can be created for analyzing and explaining the vast
and intricate dim ensions o f the office o f the President indicates a com bined flexibility
and appeal in utilizing this theoretical fram ework.
Each role can be construed as a presidential responsibility. Thus any failure to
fulfill presidential responsibilities results in institutional crisis. Furtherm ore, the
public anticipates that the president will perform his roles. The president inherits the
dual challenge o f fulfilling responsibility and exercising pow er, while at the same time
trying to m eet or control the public’s demands and at tim es, particularly in the era o f
powerful special interest groups, its whim s. As a result, the occupant of the Oval
Office can make a difference in policy form ulation, as well as, legislative and
implem entational outcom es.
Any analysis o f presidential policym aking requires references to a myriad of
discussions by scholars, journalists, and political leaders. In this project, the analysis
o f the presidential role in the arena o f environm ental policym aking is considered via a
fram ework suggestive o f a theory of presidential pow er and policym aking. This
fram ew ork is adopted from Byron Daynes and Ray Tatalovich in their work Presiden
tial P o w er. Their fram ew ork em ploys five roles and five determ inants. The five
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roles include C om m ander-in-C hief, C hief D iplom at, C hief Executive, Legislative
Leader, and O pinion/Party Leader. Each role is designated to m easure and explain
presidential pow er in a distinct m anner. It is im portant to note that each role is not
m utually exclusive in their function from the other roles. For exam ple, a president
could be perform ing all five roles sim ultaneously in a given situation. W hen Presi
dent Bush spearheaded the Allied coalition during the 1990-91 Persian G ulf crisis, he
could be viewed as perform ing all five roles in such tasks as persuading Congress to
approve his executive actions and the concom itant United Nations resolutions. He
fulfilled his C om m ander-in-C hief duties by directing the A rm ed Forces sent to the
Persian G ulf region. He perform ed his C hief D iplom at responsibilities through
enlisting Allied countries to lobby Congress for the approval o f using Am erican
A rm ed Forces in com bat operations.

He executed his C hief Executive functions by

seeking congressional support for his m ilitary actions as m andated in the Constitution.
He acted the part o f Legislative Leader in shepherding the legislation through
Congress which sought approval for the UN resolutions dictating the possible use o f
m ilitary force in the Persian G ulf area.

Finally, he assumed the opinion/ party leader

m antle by rallying both his party and the public behind his policy. So a president
could be perform ing one or a given num ber o f the roles sim ultaneously depending
upon the circum stances.
The presidency will be studied in terms of role evaluation within two presiden
tial dom ains, nam ely, C hief Executive and C hief Diplom at. It is crucial to stress that
these are not the only two roles that could be devised for evaluating presidential

policym aking. As noted previously, a president can be properly viewed as sim ulta
neously engaging in a myriad number of roles depending upon the situation. For the
purposes o f this project, these two roles are utilized in order to emphasize the roles
that have becom e prom inent in the presidential form ation of current environm ental
policy. M oreover, the application o f the five determ inants will illustrate how both
roles take on wide and eclectic policy dim ensions. F or exam ple, when a president is
perform ing his chief executive responsibilities, his actions are shaped by such
considerations as his constitutional authority, the num ber o f individuals involved in
his decision m aking, the advice o f his cabinet, public opinion, and w hether a crisis is
at hand. These considerations dem onstrate how roles are adapted to different studies
of presidential policym aking depending upon the purposes o f the author. W ithin the
confines o f this project, the application o f the five determ inants will reveal how a
president will perform opinion/party leader-type and legislative leader-type responsi
bilities while engaged in chief diplom atic or chief executive responsibilities.
W hile the roles are the prim ary analytical typologies, an initial test o f the
determ inants which act as the calculus for ascertaining presidential potential and
power, must be m ade, especially if we are to transfer the framework to substantive
policy areas, such as the environm ent, to test the strength o f the presidency.

Included

in the fram ew ork are five determ inants which seem vital to determ ining the power
available to the president in perform ing his roles. This approach has utility when
applied to any incum bent during most historical periods; and, regardless o f the scope
of governm ent activity, it provides a balanced and com prehensive theory o f presi-
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dential power.
O ur investigation is based on two key presidential roles: C hief Diplomat and
C hief Executive. A role can be properly understood as a regularly recurring pattern
o f social interaction that can be described by (1) who expects (2) whom (3) to do
what (4) in w hich situation.11 The em ploym ent o f role analysis is prevalent in the
literature for the presidency. Roles are central in texts written by C linton Rossiter,
Edward C orw in and Louis Koenig, among others. The scholars within this valuative
tradition view roles as jobs or functions; they also concur that certain roles are
earm arked in the Constitution (ie .,C h ie f Executive) whereas others have evolved upon
the president (ie.,P arty Leader).
F o r the purposes o f this w ork, a role is that set o f expectations by other
political elites and the citizenry which defines the scope o f presidential responsibilities
within a given sphere o f a c tio n .12 Each o f the two roles em phasized within this
project can be identified with a general sphere of action.

C hief Executive refers to

the com plex and ever-changing relationship o f the president to his bureaucracy, the
advisory system , and to the adm inistration o f public policy. The title C hief Diplomat
refers to our nation’s relationship within the international arena as largely defined by
the president.

T H E FIV E D E T E R M IN A N T S O F P R E S ID E N T IA L P O W E R
The dynam ics between five factors: authority, decision m aking, public input,
expertise and crisis, determ ine the political resources available to a president in each
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role. The reality that these factors have differential impact on each role explains why
a president is m ore pow erful in some roles than in others.

Here is a sum m ary o f the

determinants:

A U THO RITY
A uthority can be recognized as the m ain determ inant of presidential power.
We can speak o f authority to the extent that pow er has been "routinized" by C onstitu
tional m andate, statutory delegations, judicial precedent, and customary practice.
Furtherm ore, such authority can be passed on from president to president and
expanded, unless C ongress passes new legislation or the federal courts reinterpret
law. It is possible to gauge how much authority the president enjoys in each role by
studying the C onstitution, judicial precedent, statutory delegations, and custom s as
they have evolved historically. Customs are authoritative in the sense that they are
accepted by the public, opinion leaders, and other branches o f governm ent.

For

instance, the cabinet flourishes as a function o f custom and not constitutional m an
date.

DECISION M AKING
The president’s pow er is influenced by the num ber o f decision makers
involved in creating and executing policy.

His pow er is increased when he shares

decision making with few other political actors or centralizes it in and through the
Oval Office. The degree to which the president uses decision making capabilities and
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processes to wield more pow er, either as chief diplom at or chief executive, can he
im portant in determ ining their overall effectiveness and assertiveness in a policy area.
Thus, as chief diplom at, a president m ust address the constitutional duties given to
Congress in foreign affairs. H ow ever, as chief executive, the president m ust contend
with m ore actors. This includes his advisors, Congress, the courts, the bureaucracy,
governors, and special interest groups. The im plem entation o f federal law often
requires the cooperation o f these political actors to some degree. The president
simply wields m ore decision making pow er within the chief diplom at role relative to
the chief executive role.

PU BLIC INPU TS
W hile the president m ust rely upon close advisors in the decision m aking
process he must also consider those political actors who act as checks on his influ
ence. The president’s policy options are determ ined by the level o f political m obiliza
tion and deference to the president’s view point by the people and various interest
groups, also known as public input. F or exam ple, public opinion tends to rally
around the president when he acts as C om m ander-in-C hief or, in many instances.
C hief Diplom at. In contrast, the role o f C hief Executive is more beholden to the
m aneuvering o f clientele groups who jockey to maintain privileged access to govern
ment. The influence o f public opinion varies from one role to the other, but remains
a litmus test, depending on the incum bent o f the public’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with policy initiation.

EX PERTISE
A president’s pow er also depends on situations requiring expertise, either his
ow n or his most im m ediate set o f advisors and their set of resources.

Needless to

say, expertise varies from one Presidency to another and from one situation to
another. Expertise refers to any use of inform ation that prevents a president’s critics
from challenging his policies and actions, including secrecy and data m anipulation, as
well as expert testim ony.

Expertise aids presidential policym aking only insofar as

other policym akers and citizens acknowledge its direct relevance to policy form ation.
As C hief D iplom at, expertise can be vital since a president has near exclusive
access to inform ation sources and is able to classify data. Docum ents such as the
Pentagon Papers dem onstrate the crucial role o f expertise can be in foreign affairs.
It may be argued that expertise is a less im portant determ inant in the C hief
Executive role than it is w ithin the C hief D iplom at role. The President can rely on
Congressional feedback in the form ulation o f proposals such as the budget.

M ore

over, public and private institutions play a pivotal role in the im plem entation o f
executive policy, thus dim inishing this factor in other roles.

CRISIS
Crisis enhances a president’s power and his ability to shape policy particularly
under conditions o f arm ed conflict. Crises can provide novel opportunities for a
President, allowing him to exercise power beyond expected norm s, and m axim ize the
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rallying effect generated by the general public.
As C hief D iplom at, the President may be in a position to protect our national
interest. In this role, a crisis can quickly m obilize consensus and a feeling that
decisive action is needed. Likewise, for the C hief Executive, crisis can lead to
greater exercise o f presidential pow er in order to m eet dom estic turm oil. In this
regard, the Taft-H artley Act enables the President to delay strikes for 80 days should
they endanger the nation. Crises provide unique opportunities for presidents to
enhance their pow er and fulfill policy dem ands.

D ETER M IN A N T O V ERLAP
The five determ inant categories are not m utually exclusive.

In fact all five

determ inants could be operative sim ultaneously when the executive is engaged in the
political calculus o f constructing policy. In certain situations, the decision m aking
and expertise determ inants overlap the authority determ inant. This becam e apparent
when Bush adopted the strategy advocated by his close advisors to circum vent the
very C lean Air Act provisions he previously endorsed. The determ inants are useful
guides for analyzing the param eters o f presidential pow er and its relation to policy
m aking but it is im portant to keep in mind the determ inants do not precisely divide
the open-ended and sometim es puzzling aspects o f executive policym aking.

PO LICY ENDS
In order to analyze and assess environm ental policymaking within the exccu-
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live branch o f the federal governm ent, policy ends m ust be defined.

In the instant o f

this project policy ends, will be defined as the stated goals o f the two case areas
which will be discussed. In the case area o f the Earth Sum m it at Rio the policy ends
will be defined in term s o f the sum m it’s stated goals as delineated by the UN General
A ssem bly’s Resolution 44/128, which stipulated the sum m it’s purpose was to elabo
rate strategies and m easures to halt and reverse the effects o f environm ental degrada
tion in the context of increased national and international efforts to prom ote sustain
able and environm entally sound developm ents in all countries. In the case area o f the
Clean A ir Act the policy ends will be defined as the legislation’s clean air goals.
These goals will be elaborated upon in the third chapter.
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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY
An analysis o f G eorge B ush’s environm ental record requires a brief overview
o f the Reagan adm inistration’s environm ental perform ance. The reasons for this are
self-evident since environm ental protection cannot be conveniently parceled out into
the four year increments o f a presidential term. The political and adm inistrative
legacy o f the Reagan years had significantly defined the param eters George Bush
developed his environm ental agenda. But more im portantly, the actual condition of
the environm ent throughout the 1980s had dictated m any o f B ush’s environm ental
policy decisions. This is true despite B ush’s 1988 cam paign efforts to distance
him self from the Reagan adm inistration’s ideological and political indifference toward
environm ental concerns.

M oreover, the annual federal budget deficit had also

constrained B ush’s ability to act on environm ental problem s. Thus the two Reagan
term s set the tone for B ush’s first term on environm ental policy.
President Bush inherited an array of environm ental problem s due prim arily to
eight years o f R eagan’s fundam entally negligent presidential leadership toward the
environm ent.

R eagan’s environm ental mismanagement plagued his adm inistration

from its inception.
Not since the New Deal had any president attempted to redirect American
governm ent in such a drastic m anner. Reagan believed the governm ent itself was the
source o f many o f the co u n try ’s problem s. This belief viewed the grow th o f the
federal governm ent and its regulatory functions as crippling political liberty and
warping the social fabric and econom ic health of the nation.
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In order to rem edy the econom ic and social m aladies throughout the country,
Reagan targeted the laws developed during the 1970s that covered consum er protec
tion, energy conservation and the environm ent. Such laws symbolized and epitom ized
an unnecessary hindrance on the econom y resulting in poor econom ic com petitiveness
and lessened international prestige.
D uring the 1980 cam paign, Reagan emphasized the theme o f revitalizing the
econom y-through the relaxation o f environm ental laws and regulations. Cam paign
tactics ranged from criticizing the C lean Air Act (which was the target in R eagan’s
infam ous statement that trees were a m ajor generator o f air pollution) to an endorse
m ent o f the sagebrush rebels, a group o f ranchers, mining interests and local politi
cians from several w estern states who advocated that federal public lands be turned
over to their private control. These campaign efforts were spelled out in the Republi
can platform o f "[declaring] w ar on governm ent overregulation" and the need for
"cost-benefit analysis o f m ajor proposed regulations."
President R eagan’s approach to environm ental policy was subordinated to key
overriding economic and political objectives. Environm ental program s in themselves
received marginal focus and w ere mostly viewed as targets for deregulation efforts.
This new de-em phasis on environm ental policy was embodied in the newly composed
Council on Environm ental Q uality’s first report. The principles to direct environm en
tal policym aking included:
(1) use o f cost-benefit analysis to determ ine the value of
environm ental regulations;
(2) reliance as much as possible on the free market to
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allocate resources;
(3) decentralizing environm ental responsibilities to the
states;
(4) continuation o f cooperation with other nations to solve
global environm ental problem s.13
The adm inistration vigorously pursued the first three goals and ignored the
fourth one until the second term .
One o f Reagan’s first priorities was the creation o f the Task Force o f R egula
tory R elief headed by Vice President Bush. During its initial two years of existence,
the task force reviewed hundreds o f new and existing environm ental regulations,
rescinding some and returning many others to EPA and other agencies for further
study and m odification.14 In February 1981 the president issued Executive Order
12291, which required cost-benefit analysis o f all proposed regulations. The order
m andated:

[t]o the extent perm itted by law, all agencies must
adhere to the order’s substantive criteria in their
regulations.
These include: (1) refraining from regula
tory action unless potential benefits outweigh
potential costs to society; (2) choosing regulatory
objectives that m aximize net benefits to society;
(3) Selecting the alternatives that will impose that
least net cost to society while achieving regulatory
objectives; and (4) setting regulatory priorities to
m aximize aggregate net benefits to society, taking
into account factors such as the condition o f the
national economy and o f particular industries.15
All agency decision making was thus filtered through econom ic criteria.

New

regulatory proposals were required to be submitted to the newly formed Office of
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Inform ation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OM B. This process became a
prim ary method for arresting the creation of new regulation.
Previous presidents had attempted to establish centralized controls over the
bureaucracy but R eagan’s efforts to create an adm inistrative presidency went m uch
fu rth e r.1'1 Reagan attem pted to secure loyalty to his ideology and program via m etic
ulously screening political appointees to agency positions. He appointed unapologetic
conservative ideologues such as Anne Gorsuch (later to become Anne Burford in
1983) to head the EPA and James W att to head the Interior D epartm ent, as well as
other conservative ideologues to vital positions throughout the governm ent. M ost of
these appointees came from private enterprise or legal foundations and firms that had
opposed various environm ental regulation efforts. V ery few had sympathy or
experience in environm ental m atters. The result in the early years was a highly
politicized and ideological form o f environm ental adm inistration that drove many
senior executives and professionals out o f the environm ental agencies.17
This hostile and ideologically charged approach toward environm ental policy
form ation resulted in pitched political battles during the first three years of the Reagan
adm inistration that culm inated in the forced resignations o f both Burford and W att in
1983.

Burford resigned because a House com m ittee sought to subpoena documents

from EPA regarding possible political influence in the distribution of waste cleanup
funds in California and elsew here. Acting on W hite House instructions, she refused
to release them on the grounds o f executive privilege. This action prompted the
com m ittee to cite her for contem pt o f Congress. As a result, she became the highest
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executive official ever so charged. In the ensuing political show dow n, President
Reagan was forced to relent on the m atter o f executive privilege.

Burford resigned

and som e twenty other top EPA officials were fired in the spring o f 1983.
W att’s departure cam e in O ctober 1983, after some impolitic rem arks about
the com position o f a com m ission set up to investigate his coal-leasing policies. By
this tim e, however, it was apparent his stew ardship at Interior had little public support
to the point where he becam e an electoral liability. To m any, he had come to
sym bolize the ideological excesses o f the Reagan adm inistration during that point in
tim e.
Congress and various interest groups revolted against the Reagan policies from
their inception. A bipartisan m ajority opposed revision o f the m ajor environm ental
statutes, leading to a stalem ate w ith the Reagan adm inistration over the am endm ent o f
the C lean A ir Act and other significant laws that were up for renewal between 1981
and 1984.
R eagan’s initial efforts to achieve meaningful deregulation within the basic
fram ew ork o f environm ental law actually failed. The political strategy of seeking
changes through the executive agencies and ignoring environm ental constituencies and
public opinion backfired. Ideological appointees, such as Burford and W att, proved
to be em barrassing when the scandals they coalesced threatened to overw helm the
W hite House and R eagan’s efforts for re-election. Several prom inent conservatives
such as W illiam Niskanen and Robert Crandall had since indicated the opportunity for
transform ing environm ental regulation was lost due to such political controversies and
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the ensuing pro-environm ental backlash. Nevertheless significant environm ental
setbacks occurred. Although the key environm ental laws o f the 1960s and 1970s
rem ained intact, their im plem entation and efficacy were underm ined by the political
turm oil at EPA and other parts o f the federal governm ent. Presidential power
accounted for this developm ent.
President Reagan assum ed no notable leadership on environm ental issues
during his second term . How ever, his adm inistration appointed less controversial
figures to head the EPA and Interior after the departure o f Burford and Watt. This
attem pt at reconciliation with Congress and environm ental constituencies did result in
some im provem ent on the adm inistration’s environm ental record. F o r example,
R eagan’s second term EPA adm inistrator, Lee Thom as, joined forces with the State
D epartm ent to launch a new effort in worldwide environm ental diplom acy. Thom as
and his staff played a pivotal role in negotiations leading to the M ontreal Protocol of
1987, in which thirty nations agreed to reduce chloroflourocarbon (CFC) production
by 50 percent by 1998. A lthough this goal will probably be unm et, the M ontreal
accords achieved an im portant precedent for m ultinational agreem ents on environm en
tal protection and can be properly viewed as the Reagan adm inistration’s most
beneficial environm ental accom plishm ent.
Otherw ise Congress largely ignored the Reagan presidency’s efforts to stymie
dom estic environm ental regulatory progress. Several m ajor environm ental statutes
were reauthorized and strengthened, including the Superfund law which Reagan
threatened to veto and the new Clean W ater Acts which were passed twice over his

30

veto. Congress did rem ain deadlocked in other areas including the Clean Air Act and
pesticide reform .

TRANSITION TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The transition to the Bush adm inistration earm arked a shift in the country’s
political constellation. U nlike Reagan, Bush did not generate coattails and made no
Republican gains in the Congress; rather the Dem ocrats increased their m argins in
both houses. T hus, what appeared to be a conservative victory turned into a splitlevel realignm ent, entrenching each party in control o f a different branch o f govern
m e n t.18 President Bush realized some degree of bipartisan support was necessary for
securing his adm inistration’s policy ends.
Bush possessed the credentials to accom plish such a task. He accrued
extensive political capital from his career in the House and his various adm inistrative
and diplom atic posts. He was viewed by many as a pragm atic consensus builder who
appreciated expertise and com petence. This perception was hindered by his loyal and
positive support for Reagan and his policies. This was true in the field of environ
mental policy, prim arily because o f his role as chairm an o f the Task Force on
Regulatory Relief.

F or exam ple, the League o f Conservation Voters proved prophetic

when they rated candidate Bush a "D + " on the environm ent at the outset of the 1988
cam paign.

His running m ate, Dan Quayle, was rated as having one of the worse

environm ental records in the Senate; as senator he voted on the pro-environm ental
side o f key issues only twenty percent o f the tim e .1'1 As a result. Bush faced a
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difficult challenge in convincing the electorate he harbored a sincere desire to become
the "environm ental president".
The pledge to become the environm ental president evolved during the 1988
campaign. Bush had been searching for issues in which to distinguish him self from
Reagan. One issue that constantly surfaced am ong his cam paign advisers was the
environm ent. In m id-A ugust, the campaign staff, headed by James Baker and pollster
James Teeter, decided to schedule Bush for a week of environm ental speeches at the
end o f August and early Septem ber.
On August 31, Bush broke symbolically with R eagan’s record on environm en
tal policy in a surprise speech at the D etroit M etropark, declaring him self an environ
m entalist in the Teddy Roosevelt tradition. Bush detailed promises that included the
end o f garbage dum ping by 1991 and to prosecute illegal disposers o f medical waste;
supported a m ajor national effort to reduce waste generation and prom ote recycling;
prom ised "no net loss" o f wetlands; prom ise to convene a conference of world leaders
to discuss global environm ental problem s during his first year in office; and called for
strict enforcem ent o f toxic waste laws, saying EPA should use its authority to "sue
for triple dam ages" to force operators to clean waste sites.211
The new em phasis on the environm ent was also crafted to put his Dem ocrat
opponent. G overnor M ike Dukakis, and his cam paign staff on the defensive.

Dukakis

and the Dem ocrat cam paign staff were unprepared for Bush’s environmental attacks
and were slow in responding. This could be attributed to the Democrat campaign
staff’s notion the environm ent was "their" issue. M oreover, they failed to appreciate
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growing public concern about the environm ent due, in part, to the ongoing drought
and record sum m er highs through most o f the country. Bush’s environm ental stance
may have been im portant in keeping some wavering voters from deflecting to Dukakis
on the issue.21 All survey evidence indicated that a m ajority o f the A m erican public
supported a vigorous environm ental program either candidate proposed since bread
and butter issues were the biggest concern for most Am ericans.
Bush viewed his victory as an approval for his environm ental policies and after
the election acted swiftly to start a dialogue with key environm ental and conservation
groups. He and W hite House counsel, C. Boyden Gray, met with representatives of
thirty environm ental groups who submitted a list o f m ore than 700 proposals for
consideration by the new adm inistration.22 The transition process developed sm ooth
ly, especially in contradistinction to when Reagan first took office. By the inaugura
tion, Bush’s environm ental agenda, based on his cam paign com m itm ents, was
reasonably well set.23
Bush did set out to make good on his "environmental president" pledge. For
instance, by D ecem ber 1988, he nominated W illiam Reilly, president o f the W orld
Wildlife Fund and Conservation Foundation, to head EPA. Reilly’s selection was
warmly received by most environm ental groups and Congress. H ow ever, budget
constraints com pelled Bush to hold federal spending in order to hopefully contain the
budget deficit. Thus his first budget proposal, for FY 1990, called for the same level
of expenditures for environm ent and natural resource program s as President Reagan
had proposed.
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O therwise Bush sought to quickly establish his leadership over environm ental
policy by proposing specific policy initiatives. Bush realized a new president usually
has to act prom ptly during the first year in office if he is to achieve m ajor dom estic
policy reform .24 Ironically, the Bush adm inistration held up negotiations for an
international conference on global w arm ing until it was em barrassed by revelations
that OMB had ordered one of the governm ent’s top scientists, Dr. James Hansen of
N A SA ’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, to weaken his testim ony before C on
gress on the greenhouse effect. W hen inform ed o f this, the president quickly
reversed the adm inistration’s position and called for a workshop on global warm ing to
be held in W ashington.25 This gesture proved to haunt Bush toward the end o f his
one term presidency.
This episode and others exposed deep rifts within the Bush adm inistration over
national and international environm ental policy. The Energy, Agriculture, and
Com m erce D epartm ents, along with the OM B, had often opposed E PA ’s ideas in
cabinet m eetings. OM B director Richard D arm an, a Reaganite holdover, advocated
Bush should jettison his environm ental president pledge since the adm inistration could
"never make nature lovers a Republican constituency".2(1 Nevertheless Bush sought
to achieve substantive environm ental policy changes to make good on his pledge.
This was dem onstrated by the most significant environm ental initiative taken
during the first year: Bush’s plan for revising the Clean A ir Act, unveiled at a press
conference on June 12, 1989, to which environm ental representatives were invited.
The proposal reflected a protracted clash o f interests within the administration that
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was finally resolved in favor o f EPA chief Reilly by the president and chief o f staff,
John S ununu.27
These proposals constituted what Bush identified as a new environm ental
philosophy consisting o f five goals:
(1) to harness the powers o f the m arketplace.
(2) to encourage local initiative.
(3) to em phasize prevention instead o f ju st cleanup.
(4) to foster international cooperation.
(5) to ensure strict enforcem ent; "polluters will p a y ".28
The third and fifth points confirm ed significant distancing from the Reagan adm inistr
ation’s approach to environm ental policy form ation.
The Bush clean air proposals had three m ain goals: (1) to control acid rain by
reducing sulfur dioxide (S 0 2 ) em issions from coal-burning pow er plants by 10 million
tons (nearly half) and nitrogen oxide (N 0 2 ) em issions by 2 m illion tons by the year
2000; (2) to reduce urban air pollution (especially ozone and smog) enough to meet
clean air standards in all but twenty cities by 1995 and in all cities w ithin twenty
years; (3) and to reduce emissions o f airborne toxins by 75-90 percent by 2000.
B ush’s Clean A ir Act proposals were alm ost immediately subject to attacks
from industry. The bill sent to Congress on July 21 was w eaker than the original
proposal on several points, and the W hite House subsequently failed to defend its
provisions on clean autom obile fuels.2''
Bush did elevate environm ental policy after a decade o f neglect.

Ultimately
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this new focus proved to be a chim era dictated by public opinion and electoral
m otivations. His first m ajor environm ental proposal, drastic revision o f the Clean Air
Act, was both innovative and visionary.30 But future developm ents reversed environ
m ental advances on clean air.
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CHAPTER II

PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE CHIEF DIPLOMATIC ROLE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE AT THE 1992 EARTH SUMMIT IN
RIO

OVERVIEW
An assessment o f B ush’s actions as C hief Diplom at across the five determ i
nants of pow er and analyzing the intended and perceived actions and the extent they
affected presidential policym aking at the Rio Conference will reveal how Bush
exercised presidential pow er in achieving policy goals.

BACKGROUND
From June 3-14, 1992, the w ide-ranging, highly publicized UN C onference on
Environm ent and D evelopm ent (U N CED ) - the "Earth Summit" - was held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. The Earth Sum m it confirm ed the reality that protection o f the local
as well as the global environm ent must be integral to the developm ent process
throughout our increasingly interdependent w o rld .1 M oreover, UNCED m arked the
20th anniversary o f the UN Conference on the Hum an Environm ent, held in Stock
holm in early 1972. The Stockholm meeting was the first global conference on the
environm ent - in fact the first world conference to focus on a single issue. Stockholm
marked the arrival o f the contem porary environm ental era and because it parallels
UN CED in important aspects it is essential to address what developed in Stockholm .
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A cting on a proposal from Sw eden, the UN General Assembly called for an
international conference to exam ine, "[p]roblem s of the human environm ent...and also
to identify those aspects o f it that can only, or best be solved through international
cooperation and agreem ent".2 One hundred and fourteen governm ents sent delega
tions to Stockholm . The entire Eastern bloc boycotted the conference since East
Germ any was excluded because o f extant political conflicts over the postw ar division
of G erm any. The conference produced a D eclaration on the Hum an Environm ent, an
Action Plan for the Hum an Environm ent, and a Resolution on Institutional and
Financial A rrangem ents. The Stockholm declaration contains 26 principles concern
ing the environm ent and developm ent, many o f which had not yet been form ally
recorded in internationally recognized texts. Principle 21, in particular, is considered
by international lawyers to have served as a precedent for much o f the environm ental
diplom acy o f the past two decades; it acknow ledges states sovereignty over national
resources but stipulates that states have "[t]he responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdictional control do not cause dam age to the environm ent o f other
states or o f areas beyond the limits o f national ju risd ictio n ".1 The Action Plan
contained 109 recom m endations spanning six broad issues : human settlem ents,
natural resources m anagem ent, pollution o f international significance, educational and
social aspects o f the environm ent, developm ent and environm ent, and international
organizations.
The legacy o f the Stockholm Conference has not been thoroughly analyzed by
scholars.

H ow ever, Stockholm did establish the UN Environm ent Program (U N EP),
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furthered the need for cooperation to reduce m arine pollution, and created a global
m onitoring netw ork. These developm ents have been cited as lasting achievem ents.
Several authors have argued that the practice o f preparing for such a trem endous
conference galvanized public opinion and educated governm ents about what was then
an issue o f only recent salience.4
U N C ED was organized in part, to coordinate the divergent paths o f environ
mental protection that nations have forged during the two decades since the UN
Conference on the H um an Environm ent in Stockholm . The industrialized countries,
to a greater extent, have integrated environm ental protection into their policy m aking
process. All now feature environm ental specialists, legal and political institutions for
evaluating environm ental threats and developing and implem enting responses. The
depth o f environm ental policym aking capacity does vary among these countries, but,
as a group, they have m ade dram atic progress over the past 20 years.5
The developing w orld has experienced m arginal improvement in their capacity
to respond to environm ental threats, and none m atches the capacities found in the
environm entally active nations o f the industrialized N orth. The developing South is
com pelled to view environm ental protection inseparably from economic issues. The
persistence o f severe poverty sustains the continuation o f disease and squalor,
environm ental policies in themselves are unable to enhance either public health or
natural beauty.

Environm ental protection in the South is tied down by the lethargic

pace o f econom ic developm ent. The realization o f this fact undergirded the convic
tion o f the W orld Com m ission on Environm ent and Development that it is. "futile to
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attempt to deal with environm ental problem s without a broader perspective that
encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international equality".'’
In 1987, the com m ission recom m ended to the UN General Assem bly the
establishm ent o f U N C ED and the Assem bly approved the m easure in D ecem ber 1989.
Stockholm veteran M aurice Strong o f Canada was named secretary-general of the
conference. General Assembly Resolution 44/228 which initiated the conference,
states that U N C E D ’s purpose was to "elaborate strategies and m easures to halt and
reverse the effects o f environm ental degradation in the context o f increased national
and international efforts to prom ote sustainable and environm entally sound develop
ment in all countries".7
M ost o f the prelim inary w ork for the conference was conducted by the
Prepatory C om m ittee (PrepC om ), which held an organizational m eeting in M arch
1990 and four substantive sessions from August 1990 to April 1992.x The m ajority
o f the negotiating was conducted during the fourth and final PrepC om , the "New
York M arathon", w here consensus was reached on the Rio D eclaration and on about
85 percent o f the text o f Agenda 21. The balance, including the controversial items,
were forw arded to Rio for negotiation under the strict deadline imposed by the arrival
of most heads o f state and m inisters at the end o f the conference. Also scheduled for
signing at U N C ED w ere two environm ental treaties that had been negotiated separate
ly and concluded in Spring 1992 on clim ate change and biodiversiy and a nonbinding
statement o f forest principles resurrected from the wreckage o f a failed earlier attempt
to negotiate a treaty on forests.
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The form al intergovernm ental U N CED process produced five documents
signed by heads o f state: the "Rio D eclaration"; a statement o f broad principles to
guide national conduct on environm ental protection and developm ent; treaties on
clim ate change and biodiversity; a statem ent o f forest principles, and "Agenda 21" a
massive docum ent presenting detailed w orkplans for sustainable developm ent through
out the 21st century, including goals, responsibilities and estimates for funding.
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RIO D ECLA RATIO N
The Rio Declaration was originally conceived o f as an "Earth C harter," a
statem ent o f environm ental principles for national behavior: although the Rio
declaration was the only unbracketed text to em erge from the PrepC om m eeting,
rum ors spread throughout U N C ED that the United States governm ent would reopen
negotiations on the declaration. The strongest U .S . objection was to principle 23,
which called for the protection o f the environm ent and natural resources o f "people
under oppression, dom ination, and occupation". In a late com prom ise involving the
United States, Israel, and the A rab states, this phrase was retained in the declaration
but all references to people under occupation was rem oved from A genda 21. The
United States accom m odated its other objections by issuing a statem ent o f its reserva
tion to several principles, including the right to developm ent, which it said could be
used to justify hum an-rights violations, and the principle o f "differentiated responsibilites".

45

CO N V EN TIO N on CLIM A TE C H A N G E
Because of U N C E D ’s political prom inence, many other international environ
mental debates were m erged into the proceedings. These included those o f the
conventions on climate change and biodiversity, which were not negotiated at
U N CED or in the PrepCom m eetings but were signed in Rio following separate
negotiations. In the case o f the Convention on Clim ate Change, the UN General
Assem bly passed a resolution in D ecem ber 1990 that launched the Intergovernm ental
N egotiating Com m ittee (IN C). A fter five negotiating sessions how ever, discussions
stalled betw een the United States and other industrial countries, particularly those o f
the European Com m unity which argued that the convention should contain specific
com m itm ents to limit em issions o f carbon dioxide - at present the largest contributor
to hum an-induced changes in radiative forcing -to 1990 levels by 2000. The United
States argued that such limits were prem ature and lacked sufficient scientific evidence
and that any controls should be enacted com prehensively on all gases altering the
clim ate.
IN C Chairm an Jean Ripert o f France broke the deadlock last M ay by drafting
a com prom ise document that required industrial countries to design national emission
limits and emission inventories and to report periodically on their progress, without
targets or dates. Instead o f detailed com m itm ents, the countries would accept a circu
itously worded goal of returning their greenhouse-gas emissions to "earlier levels" by
the turn o f the century. All the key participants accepted the convention, which was
finalized in May 1992, so that there would be a treaty to sign in Rio. Although the
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treaty lacked specific em ission targets it contains a very strong objective: "stabiliza
tion o f greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atm osphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the clim ate system ...w ithin a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystem s to adapt naturally".9

CO N V EN TIO N on BIODIVERSITY
Discussions for a convention on biological diversity, or biodiversity, which
concluded on M ay 22, 1992 in N airobi, were initiated in 1988 by the United Nations
Environm ent P rogram ’s (U N EP) Governing Council. The issues o f biodiversity and
biotechnology were originally treated by separate working groups, but were combined
to be addressed by a single intergovernm ental negotiating com m ittee in 1991, over the
objections o f the United States and other nations. The treaty features three goals: the
conservation o f biological diversity, the sustainable use o f biological diversity, and the
fair sharing o f products m ade from genestocks.
The negotiations were ham pered by conflict over the financial m echanism , the
sharing o f benefits, and biotechnology regulation.

For exam ple, France threatened

not to sign because it did not incorporate a list o f global biodiversity-rich regions;
Japan threatened not to sign because it opposed biotechnology regulation. At the last
stage, both relented, and only the United States refused to sign the treaty because
officials believed that the financial m echanism represented an open-ended commitment
with insufficient oversight and control; that the benefit-sharing provisions were
incom patible with existing international regimes for intellectual property rights and
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that the requirem ent to regulate the biotechnology industry would needlessly stifle
innovation. Although only 30 ratifications were required for it to enter into force,
153 nations signed the convention in Rio.

FO REST PRIN CIPLES
Since an early attem pt to negotiate a treaty on the protection o f global forests
failed, the PrepCom added a legally nonbinding declaration on forests to its own
agenda. Although some delegations advocated adding a statem ent to the forest
principles that either explicitly called for or excluded a future treaty, the final
docum ent merely com m its governm ents to keeping the principles "under assessment
for their adequacy w ith regard to further international cooperation on foreign is
su e s" .10

A G EN D A 21
Agenda 21 is the sole docum ent signed at U N C ED that attem pts to embrace
the entire environm ent and developm ent agenda. It is also the largest product o f
U N C E D , com prising 40 chapters and 800 pages and states goals and priorities
regarding a dozen m ajor resource, environm ental, social, legal, financial, and
institutional issues.
Agenda 21 is not a legally binding docum ent but a "work plan," or "agenda
for action," with a political com m itm ent to pursue a set of goals. It has become "soft
law ," since the UN General Assem bly adopted it in fall 1992. Agenda 21 included

estim ates o f the annual costs o f its program s in developing countries from 1993 to
2000, o f which about $125 billion per year will be requested from industrial coun
tries. Agenda 21 also recom m ends industrialized countries to contribue 0.7 percent o f
their G N P toward A genda 21 goals. The United States has not made any com m it
ments to increase O D A (official developm ent assistance) levels to 0.7 percent, and
have not shown any signs o f fulfilling them .
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A PPLIC A TIO N OF TH E FIV E D ETERM INA NTS TO TH E C H IE F DIPLO M A TIC
RO LE IN TH E CA SE AREA O F B U SH ’S PO LICYM A KING AT T H E RIO
C O N FE R EN C E

AUTHORITY
In term s o f the president’s chief diplomatic duties, the C onstitution o f the
United states constructs a partnership between the legislative and executive branches
in the conduct o f foreign policy. Am ong the shared powers is the prerogative to join
in the establishm ent o f com m itm ents abroad, as expressed in the treaty-m aking
provisions o f Article II, section 2 o f the Constitution, the only explicit reference to
international treaty-m aking in the founding documents. This passage states that the
president "shall have pow er by and with the advice o f the senate to m ake treaties,
provided tw o-thirds o f the senators c o n c u r..."
The role of the president and his subordinates in the executive branch has
alw ays been substantial in the m aking of treaties, reaching beyond the brief statement
o f A rticle II, Section 2. Hollis Barber describes the president’s influence:

It is on his initiative and responsibility that the
treaty-m aking process is undertaken; he deter
mines what provisions the United States wishes to
have em bodied in the treaty; he decides whether
reservations or am endm ents that the senate atta
ches to a draft treaty are acceptable to him and
should be subm itted to other parties to the treaty;
and even if the senate by two-thirds vote approves
a treaty that he has negotiated, he may, influenced
by changes o f heart or political conditions, decide
not to ratify it, and at the last minute file it in his
w astebasket."
The final ratification o f a treaty, then lies within the power o f the President
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and not, as commonly m isconceived, the Senate. He is the official who issues the
formal statements indicating that the United States considers a treaty in effect and
binding.
The president does exercise significant powers although the language o f Article
II, Section 2 is unequivocal. The Founders made unm istakably plain their intentions
to withhold from the president the pow er to enter into treaties by h im self.12 The
Senate was designed to be a strong partner in the making of com m itm ents overseas;
yet in recent decades, presidents - and subordinates within the executive branch - have
often involved our nation in foreign obligations without the advice and consent of the
Senate o r the Counsel o f the House. Originally designed to be the m ethod to reach
agreem ents with other nations, the num ber o f treaties ratified has been few. Through
the aegis o f broad constitutional claim s, the executive branch has unilaterally entered
into several international pacts, without Congressional input or perceived interference.
One notable exam ple com es from the adm inistration o f Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The president signed an agreem ent in 1940 with Great Britain (anticipating a German
invasion) to provide fifty destroyers in return for selected British naval bases through
out the Caribbean. Such a broad com m itm ent provided legal grounds for a Germ an
declaration of war against the United States. The treaty process was circum vented:
the president’s signature sealed the pact. The method Roosevelt used had the effect
o f eroding the agreem ent-m aking procedure established by the Constitution. This
solitary incursion on the Senate’s treaty powers provided a precedent for further
inroads, from military and econom ic comm itm ents abroad to those dealing with
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transportation, com m unications, and several other policy a re a s.13
W hile the president continues to exercise broad discretion in the area of treaty
making, Congress is able to influence and participate in contem porary agreementmaking endeavors. Congressional responses to executive excesses during the Vietnam
era account for some of the executive-congressional cooperation in key foreign policy
initiatives. A fter countless individual expressions o f dissatisfaction over presidential
dom inance in the conduct o f the Vietnam W ar, statutory efforts toward a foreignpolicy partnership between the branches has evolved to a limited degree. F or
exam ple, the Case-Zablocki reporting requirem ents enacted in 1972 which require the
D epartm ent o f State to report all statutory and executive agreem ents to Congress
within sixty days, have altered the executive’s ability to m inim ize Congressional
influence in the crafting o f foreign agreem ents.
President Bush exercised his authority at UN CED with alm ost no congressio
nal cooperation. M oreover, Bush utilized his treaty-m aking authority w ithin the vast
confines o f constitutional m andate, statutory allocation and custom ary practice, to the
extent necessary he believed his dom estic political situation required. He signed only
the pacts he deemed harm less to his dom estic fortunes and ignored agreem ents viewed
as detrim ental.
Bush chose an unfortunate path to direct his presidential authority.

The United

States is viewed as the single superpow er on the planet in the post-Cold w ar era and
is accordingly in a unique position to influence most significant international agree
ments unlike any other nation.

UN CED provided an opportunity for the US to exert
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its prestige on global environm ental policy.
International conferences and institutions are only as effective as governm ents
choose to m ake them. International efforts to prom ote environm ental protection have
been m ost effective when they enhance governm ental concern, provide a forum for
governm ents to harm onize international policies, and improve international capacities
to cope with environm ental th re a ts.14
Bush opted not to use his presidential authority to advance US leadership on
the agreem ents addressed at U N C ED . On the contrary, heads o f state, environm ental
activists and United Nations officials called in every chit and twisted every arm to
encourage G eorge Bush to attend the Earth Sum mit. W hat would be the point o f a
conference on the future of the planet, after all, if the globe’s only superpow er stayed
hom e? Bush did choose to attend the conference but Rio partisans swallow ed a bitter
pill.
Bush adopted an intransigent approach to the summ it. His dom estic concerns
dictated to a notable degree the United States resistance to several key agreem ents.
Bush exercised his authority toward such an end. First, the W hite House weakened
the clim ate-change pact, angering European countries that wanted an agreem ent with
teeth. Then the adm inistration refused to sign the biodiversity treaty, which is
supported by m ore than 120 nations from Germ any to India to Brazil, and publicly
snubbed its own delegation chief when he made a last-ditch attempt to get the White
House on board.

Finally, to cap o ff the chaos. W ashington sprang a June surprise: a

forest-preservation proposal that alienated just about everyone.

This brittle and hardened use o f authority resulted in a noticeable loss o f
global stature for the United States. The United States alienation o f other countries
included m ajor allies. Razali Ism ail, M alaysia’s U .N . am bassador observed: "We
believed this [summit] could be a shining exam ple o f N orth-South cooperation.

[The

[A m erican actions] go against the whole spirit of what we are trying to do h e re " .ls
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D ECISIO N M AKING
President Bush possessed a virtual m onopoly on the decision m aking process at
the Earth Sum mit. He channeled m ost decision making functions through the Oval
Office. Political actors, except for top cabinet officials and congressional partici
pants, played m arginal roles in the decision m aking before, during, and after the
sum m it. The ability to centralize decision m aking stems from the president’s treaty
making authority.
The president’s pow er is affected by the num ber o f policym akers involved in
form ulating and implem enting a given policy. His power is strengthened when he
shares decision m aking with few other political acto rs.16 This notion originates from
E .E . Shattschneider’s contention that, as the "scope o f conflict affecting an issue
increases, the expansion in the num ber o f participants in that dispute precludes its
control by any group of decision m ak e rs".17 Congressional efforts to persuade
President Bush to attend the conference dem onstrate how other political actors were
distanced from the decision making efforts.
On April 7, 1992, the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging
President Bush to assume a leadership role at the Earth Summit. The resolution (H
C on 292) was passed 87-11, paralleled the M arch 17th House approved version. The
Senate m easure urged Bush to support international environm ental cooperation and
inject a "strong and active role at U N C E D ".Ix
President Bush was the only leader am ong the Group o f Seven leading
industrial nations who had not, at that point in tim e, indicated if he would participate
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in the conference. The House shared the Senate’s concern about Bush’s possible nonattendance at the conference. The Foreign Affairs Subcom mittee on W estern
Hem isphere A ffairs approved by voice vote on February 4, 1992 a resolution (H Con
Res 263) asking the president to personally participate in the conference. Subcom m it
tee C hairm an Robert G. T orricelli, D -N .J., observed, "I believe without [Bush’s]
active participation, the result o f the conference could be underm ined significant
ly " .14
M oreover, Rep. Henry W axm an, D- C alif., in a bid to place Congress at the
vanguard o f global environm ental issues, introduced bill HR 4750 which would have
m andated reductions in air pollution levels thought to contribute to the greenhouse
effect. W axm an contended, "It is tim e Congress stepped in to m andate that the U.S.
take a m ore responsible position - ju st as we did in 1990 when the Bush adm inis
tration was unwilling to support strengthening the international program to protect the
ozone lay er".211
The congressional resolution m irrored the sentiment o f the 157 nations that
attended the conference. The United States and other participants, had been engaged
in m ultitrack negotiations for two years, hoped to produce binding international
treaties to stem possible clim ate dam age and protect biodiversity and dwindling world
forests.

A m ajor stum bling block had been the Bush adm inistration's refusal to

agree to specific reductions in the U .S .’s carbon dioxide emissions. The adm inistrati
o n ’s resistance was underscored February 6, 1992, when a Gore amendm ent on the
National Energy Security Act (S 2166) regarding carbon dioxide drew a veto threat
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forcing G ore to withdraw.
G ore argued, "The United States has been the principal obstacle to progress in
the negotiations. On some clim ate change questions, the lineup has been 139 nations
on one side and the Bush adm inistration on the other. The adm inistration’s role has
been a d isaster".21
Despite congressional and international pressure, Bush did not immediately
com m it to attending. By M arch 23, 1992, he noted that he would like to participate
but was constrained by dom estic concerns and the presidential cam paign. Bush had
been buffeted with attacks by conservative presidential challenger Pat Buchanan and
by D em ocrats who criticized him for preoccupation with foreign affairs at the expense
o f dom estic problem s.
The conference also began one day after the key June 2 California prim ary,
which the Bush cam paign approached w ith concern. Although C alifornia voters are
known for supporting environm ental issues, some Republican voters w ere receptive to
conservative them es such as Buchanan’s "America First" cam paign them e. Bush did
soundly defeat Buchanan in the prim ary despite early concerns o f a possibly em bar
rassing defeat or a razor thin victory.
C ongress recognized the adm inistration’s apprehension about attending the
conference in the context o f the presidential cam paign’s political calculus. As Gore
suggested, "The president and his advisers should not expect criticism from the
D em ocrats for taking the trip. One reason we put this measure [S Res 87| forward
and get bipartisan support was to send that m essage".22
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But a few Republicans found irony in urging Bush to take on m ore foreign
travel, especially since some D em ocrats m ade it a point o f criticism .

For instance,

Robert J. Lagom arsino, R -C alif., argued that Congress had been silent on U. S.
participation until the February 4th House resolution and added: "U nfortunately, the
Congress has not been silent on the issue of attacking President Bush on his travels
outside the co u n try ".23
On the Senate side, Sen. M itch M cConnell, R-K y., raised concerns about the
potential im pact o f the conference on Am erica jobs and successfully offered an
am endm ent to the M arch 4, 1992, Senate resolution (S Con Res 89) to discourage
Bush from com m itting to any action that w ould reduce U .S . jo b s.24
Despite the overall bipartisan support, all the opponents to the final Senate
resolution (H C on Res 292) were Republican. Sen. M alcolm W allop, R -W yo., said,
"If global w arm ing is occurring and it is harm ful, the [Earth Sum mit] solution, will
do nothing to solve this partial problem ".25
W allop successfully offered am endm ents that would call for any additional
financial contributions from the United States to be voluntary and state that global
w arm ing is only a partial threat. The Senate added its resolution (S Con Res 89) to
the shell o f the sim ilar House-passed version.
The House was more vigorous than the Senate in sending Bush a message o f
its own. On February 4, 1992, the Foreign Affairs Subcom mittee o f W estern
Hem isphere Affairs approved, by voice vote, a resolution (H C on Res 263) asking the
president to personally participate in the conference. W ithin threes weeks another
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House panel approved a sim ilar resolution. The Foreign A ffairs Subcom m ittee on
Hum an Rights and International O rganizations approved a non-binding resolution (H
Con Res 2660 by voice vote, calling on Bush to participate in the conference with
other heads o f state.
The final House version (H C on Res 292) - again approved by voice vote was stronger in tone than the Senate version. Sponsored by House Foreign Affairs
Com m ittee Chairm an Dante B. Fascell, D -F la., it stated that the United States should
place a "high priority" on the sum m it’s success through "the personal participation of
the president of the United States". The final House resolution encom passed the
previous non-binding resolutions approved by the Foreign Affairs subcom m ittees.
The limited num ber o f outside political actors involved in the decision making
process toward the sum m it enabled Bush to achieve his policy goals on the domestic
and international fronts. Ironically, the accom plishment o f the goals did not result in
the political objectives desired. This unintended outcom e o f Bush’s decision making
is reflected in three policy areas. First, Bush and his closest advisors sought to
project U .S . leadership at the conference despite early resistance to participating and
adopting policy positions known to oppose the policy goals o f the vast majority of
other countries. Rather than asserting leadership, Bush achieved near universal
reproach from international governm ents, outside political actors, and domestic
constituents. Bush sealed the "green vote’s" opposition and loss key moderate
support in the 1992 presidential election. The adm inistration’s hard line on the
environm ent did not win many votes - and may have even hurt the Republicans.
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EX PERTISE
Out o f the five valuative criteria, the expertise determ inant perhaps best
reveals why President B ush’s approach to the Earth Sum m it was inconsistent and
puzzling. His vacillating approach confirm ed in many people’s m inds that Bush was
"wishy-washy" on m ajor policy issues and conducted U .S. foreign policy at Rio in an
appalling manner.
In the role o f chief diplom at, the president’s effectiveness is enhanced to the
extent that decision m aking requires expertise on two levels. F irst, expertise is
dependent upon a m onopoly o f inform ation sources and know ledge o f technical
m atters. This level o f expertise stem s either from his own or on his m ost immediate
set o f advisors and theory set o f resources. Second, the expertise determ inant refers
to the use o f inform ation that denies a president’s critics from being able to assess his
policies, including data m anipulation.
On both levels, President B ush’s lack o f expertise damaged his chief diplom at
ic powers at the conference. O f course, he did not possess technical knowledge of
the scientific issues underlying the treaties negotiated at the sum m it nor was he
expected to by other political actors and the public.

H ow ever, his advisors provided

conflicting views that resulted in a policy nightm are. This conflict originated within
his own cabinet betw een his conservative advisors who philosophically opposed the
sum m it, and the relatively m oderate advisors who recognized the sum m it as a world
historical event requiring his active participation and possible forceful leadership.
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His conservative advisors believed his absence from the sum m it was the best
policy option. Otherw ise a "stand tall" stance at the summit would hopefully salvage
his reelection bid. They viewed the conference almost exclusively through an election
lens and opposed most o f the conference’s agenda on ideological grounds.
This conservative opposition w ithin Bush’s cabinet took on different forms
from different advisors. O pposition to the biodiversity treaty originated from Vice
President Dan Quayle since the treaty featured the developing w orld’s desire for
royalties and property rights in return for supplying pharm aceutical com panies with
the genetic wealth o f their forests. F o r exam ple, the treaty would require a com pany
that developed a drug from snake venom - as Bristol-M yers Squibb did - to share
profits with the nation that saved the snake by preserving its habitat.
In an internal m em o, the chairm an o f the Council on Com petitiveness, Dan
Quayle, blasted the biodiversity treaty, partly because it would "facilitate access to
genetic m aterial for environm entally sound uses, [and] prom ote fair and equitable
sharing of. ..benefits arising from the use o f genetic m aterials".21’
The director o f the Office o f M anagem ent and Budget, Richard Darm an,
treated the invitation to Rio the way people react to a postcard urging them to call a
900 num ber and find out which o f the three prizes they’ve already w o n .27 His
opposition stemmed from concern about losing conservative and business support.
O ther opponents included staffers Bill Kristol and Davis Rivkin, dom estic policy
advisor Teresa G orm an, and econom ic advisor M ichael Boskin.
A sample o f the right wing opposition to the conference’s agenda and general
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spirit captures the m otives for these advisor’s apprehension about their boss attending
the conference.
John Creagan, president o f the US Business and Industrial Council, referred to
the conference as the "Global M eeting o f the New W orld Odor" , since he believed it
put politics ahead o f science, and wealth redistribution ahead o f wealth creation.2S
M urray W eidenbaum , director o f the C enter for The Study o f Am erican
Business, noted " the Bush A dm inistration will have to brace itself for an unprece
dented, outpouring o f high decibel, self-righteous, unscientific exaggerations. It is
vital that the United States continues to be the odd m an out. There is no benefit from
joining these other industrialized nations that are trying to carry favor with the poorer
countries by advocating extrem e positions unsupported by science or econom ics".24
The m oderate advisor’s believed his absence at the conference would be more
politically damaging than attendance. They recognized the necessity o f U .S. partici
pation at a world conference on the environm ent and developm ent in order to insure
U .S. input on such issues and m aintain U .S. leadership within the new world order.
M oreover, Am erican public opinion, Congress, and m ost other participating nations
supported Bush representing the U .S. at the conference. W ithout his presence, both
the presidency and the country risked em barrassm ent on the dom estic and internation
al scene.
A fter three m onths o f hesitation, Bush sided with EPA chief W illiam Reilly,
national-security adviser Brent Scow croft, and cam paign chief Bob Teeter. Reilly was
the num ber-one booster since he supported an environm ental agenda that could make
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a reality o f Bush’s environm ental president pledge. He even went as far as suggesting
he would resign if Bush did not attend. Scow croft reasoned it would be a m ajor
em barrassm ent for the leader o f a new world order to skip the m eeting at which the
very concept would be shaped. Finally, Teeter thought it made solid electoral sense
to cloak candidate Bush in green.
Bush him self decided to participate since he probably believed it necessary to
partake in a forum featuring m ost o f the world leaders. Also the summit provided an
opportunity to dem onstrates he cares about an issue that most people are concerned
about. And as his cam paign chief suggested, it would be a stratagem to deflect
criticism on him from Bill C linton and the press.
Both Reilly and Scow croft invoked the support many business executives
extended to the conference. The Business Council for Sustainable Development,
which played a prom inent role at Rio, includes the heads o f international corporations
such as Dow Chem ical, D uPont, Chevron, and 3M . This council advocates a
"responsible" approach to the environm ent since, "There can be no economic devel
opm ent without environm ental responsibility". This lent credence to Reilly and
Scow croft’s contention that key interests in the business com m unity championed the
sum m it’s agenda or, at the least, business was not unified in its opposition to the
conference.
How ever, Bush predicated U .S. participation on treaty concessions intended to
win the support o f certain dom estic constituents and appease conservative critics.
Ironically, these concessions accom plished marginal gains amongst conservative
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voters and did not convert any other bloc of voters.

Furtherm ore, Bush confirm ed

the environm entalist’s worse fears about his sincerity on environm ental policym aking.
From their perspective, his 1988 campaign pledge to be the "Environm ental Presi
dent", became an epitaph o f hypocrisy and vacuity.
Bush m istakenly believed he could appease his conservative critics and gain
credibility on environm ental issues sim ultaneously. He adopted this line o f action by
relying on his advisors and seeking to strike a balance between their conflicting
views. Instead of gaining the best of both w orlds, he inherited the worse o f both
w orlds. The expertise gap dam aged his presidency.

PUBLIC IN PU TS
President B ush’s policy options at the Earth Sum m it were, in part, dictated by
the vicissitudes o f public opinion and the pressure o f interest groups. Both played a
role in B ush’s conduct at the summ it.
Three developm ents revolving around the conference illustrate how public
inputs shaped Bush’s policy m aking at the sum m it. First, he proposed a small fund to
abet forest protection in order to set forth his ow n environm ental program during the
election year and possibly placate critics of his environm ental policy making .
Second, Bush sought to m aintain a reasonable sem blance o f his pledge to be the
"environmental president" in order to cam paign credibly on environm ental issues.
Finally, public opinion polls reflected public cynicism about Bush’s handling of
environm ental policy.
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B ush’s small fund proposal for rain forests was motivated by the desire to
shore up his standing with environm entalists who had attacked his recent decision’s
regarding wetlands, endangered species, and Clean A ir Act im plem entation.

M ore

over, his W hite House advisors believed such a proposal would be B ush’s imagesprucing plan for the election. Two days before the earthfest began, Bush proposed
increasing funds for international forest program s from $1.35 billion to $2.7 billion,
and upping the U .S. com m itm ent from $150 m illion a year to $270 m illion. The
rationale was sound: because forests store carbon, saving them holds dow n the carbon
dioxide that contributes to global warm ing. And if forests are preserved, so are the
species that inhabit them.
This proposal was form ulated to perform the dual task of dealing with the
biodiversity pact and creating a distinct environm ental program in time for the
presidential cam paign. H ow ever, this policy created befuddlement and failed to
perform the assigned dual task. To begin with no one in the adm inistration could
delineate how the funds would be allocated. W ould it address so-called root causes of
deforestation, such as the poverty that forces people to chop trees for fuel? or would
it buy more Jeeps for foresters to drive around M alaysian clear cuts? Previous
international forestry plans have left environm entalists skeptical; for exam ple, the
W orld Bank has funded "forestry" projects that contributed to deforestation.
Also the policy was not self-im posed on the U .S. revealing Bush as em ploying
a double standard. The adm inistration proposal offered new money for tropical-forest
protection while it continued to perm it logging o f old-growth forests in the Pacific
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Northwest.
B ush’s efforts to shore up his 1988 cam paign pledge to be the "environm ental
president" fell short.

D uring the 1988 race, then Vice President Bush vowed to

com bat the greenhouse effect with the "W hite House effect", and castigated G overnor
Dukakis for his inability to clean up Boston H arbor.

By 1992, Bush em phasized his

election bid before any specific pledges regarding environm ental policy. Between the
elections Bush did gain good m arks for his 1990 Clean Air Act revision efforts but
had weakened some o f the provisions he supported and thus gained the dism ay o f the
public. The Clean A ir Act revisions and other policy decisions left Bush vulnerable
to attacks about his concern for the environm ent.

He decided attending the Rio

conference could im prove public perception toward his pledge to be the environm ent
president.
U nfortunately for Bush, his participation at the Rio proceedings did not alter
public opinion to his advantage. A Tim e/C N N poll conducted in Septem ber 1992
confirm ed the public’s skepticism about Bush’s approach to the environm ent. In this
poll, half the respondents said the loss o f jobs due to environm ental regulations was a
"big problem ".

Yet when asked to choose betw een protecting the environm ent and

protecting jobs, 48% chose the environm ent while 36% chose jobs.

Forty percent of

those questioned said they would be less likely to vote for a candidate if they
disagreed with his environm ental position even if they agreed on other m ajor issues.
Such poll indicators resulted in electoral defeat for Bush, whose credibility on
the issue was not high.

W hen asked w hether they felt Bush lied when he said he
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would be the environm ental president, 60% said yes. The figures were larger among
baby boom ers (62% ) and independents (63% ).
lied about his intentions.

Am ong Republicans, 40% agreed he
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CRISIS
The president’s ability to mold policy during crisis typically involves condi
tions o f arm ed conflict or econom ic em ergency. President B ush’s adept engineering
o f U .S . policy during the Persian G ulf W ar conflict serves as a recent exam ple of
how a president can exercise significant pow er in the policym aking process and
m obilize general public support for a policy. Likewise Franklin D. Roosevelt
generated the same success for his N ew Deal legislation during the econom ic crisis of
the G reat Depression.
The Earth Summit did not present a crisis in the m ilitary sense o f the Persian
G ulf W ar or in the econom ic sense o f the G reat Depression. H ow ever, several heads
o f state, various interest groups and segm ents o f the Am erican view the current status
o f the global environm ent as an ongoing crisis or as an im m inent crisis. From their
perspective the sum m it provided a novel opportunity to address the crisis situation
involving the clim ate, biodiversity, endangered species, developm ent in the South,
and so on. The Bush adm inistration was in a position to adopt a sim ilar perspective
toward the global environm ent and thus utilize the prestige o f the W hite House to
confront a crisis situation in order to protect the national interest and possibly save the
world ecosystem . Such an approach may have lent Bush a rallying point for public
support and provide him with increased pow er in the area o f environm ental poicymaking.
Bush and his advisors failed to capitalize on such a rare opportunity.

Bush

chose to dow nplay the crisis nature o f the current global environm ent and opted to
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rely on Vice President Q uayle’s contention regarding the environm ent.

Quayle, as

previously noted, argued that the existing program s to im prove the environm ent were
m ore than adequate; that the state o f A m erica’s air, w ater, and forests is getting better
and that further im provem ents will com e at the expense o f jobs.

69

ENDNOTES

1. UN C hronicle. June 1992, 29:40.
2. UN Resolution 2398, as quoted in L.K . Caldw ell, International Environm entalPolicv:
Em ergence and D im ensions. 2nd ed. D urham , N .C .: Duke University, 1990.
3. P .M . Haas, M .A . Levy, and E.A . Parson, "How should We Judge U N C E D ’s Success?",
E nvironm ent. October 1992, 34:8,9.
4. R .C larke and L.Tim berlake. Stockholm Plus T en , London: Earthscan, 1982: Erich Schm idt,
Twenty Years A fter Stockholm 1972-1992. Berlin: The Agesta Group AB, 1992.
5. B rief reviews o f environm ental policym aking include C .C . Park, ed., Environm ental Policies:
An International Review . London: C roon Helm , 1986, and W orld Resources Institute,
"Industrial C ountries," W orld Resources 1992-93, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press,
1992, chpt.2.
6. W orld Com m ission on Environm ent and Developm ent. Our Com m on F uture. Oxord,
England: Oxford University Press, 1987.
7. UN Resolution 44/228, part 1.3, New Y ork, 22 D ecem ber 1989.
8. UN CED Prepatory Com m ittee,
ary/February 1991, 16.

"Charting the Course for ’92,"

E nvironm ent. Janu

9. UN Fram ew ork Convention on Clim ate C hange. 9 May 1992, article 2.
10. UN D ocum ent.A /C O N F. 15 1 /6 /R ev .1, "Forest Principles," June 13, 1992.
11. Barber H ollis, Foreign Policies o f the United States. New York: D ryden, 1953, 30.
12. Raoul Berger, "The Presidential M onoply of Foreign Relations," M ichigan Law Review 71
(1972), 39.
13. Louis Fisher, The President and Congress: Pow er and P olicy. New York: Free Press, 1972.
14. M .A . Levy, P.M . Hass, and R.O . Keohane, "Institutions for the Earth: Prom oting
International Environm ent Protection, E nvironm ent. May 1992, 12.
15. N ew sw eek. June 15, 1992, 119:45, 30.
16. Byron Daynes and Raymond Tatalovich, Presidential P ow er. Ithaca: Peacock Press, 1984.

70

17. E.E . Schattschneider, The Sem i-Sovereign P eople. New York: Holt, Rinehart and W inston,
1960, chapter 1.
18. Congressional Q uarterly. April 17, 1992, 50:15, 948.
19. I b id , Feb. 8, 1992, 50:6, 302.
20. IM d , April 11, 1992, 50:15, 948.
21. Ib id .. Feb. 8, 1992, 50:6, 302.
22. I b id . April. 11, 1992, 50:15, 948.
23. I M . Feb. 8, 1992, 50:6, 302.
24. IM d , M arch 7, 1992, 50:10, 535.
25. Ib id .. April 11, 1992, 50:5, 948.
26. N ew sw eek. June 15, 1992, 119:24, 31.
27. Ib id .. June 1, 1992, 21.
28. Christian Science M onitor. 6/3 /9 2 , 3.
29. New Republic. April 27, 1992, 206:17, 56.

CHAPTER III

PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ROLE - AN ASSESSMENT
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE 1990
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS

O V ERV IEW
An assessm ent o f Bush’s actions as C hief Executive across the five determ i
nants o f pow er and analyzing the intended and perceived actions and the extent they
affected presidential policym aking in the execution o f the 1990 Clean A ir Act
am endm ents will reveal how Bush exercised presidential pow er in achieving policy
goals.

BA CK G RO U N D
The federal response to air pollution originated in 1955 when C ongress passed
the Air Pollution Control Act. This Act authorized the Public Health Service to
conduct research and offer technical expertise and financial assistance to the states on
air pollution m atters. The Clean A ir A ct of 1963 marked the first m ajor federal
initiative toward air pollution containm ent. Congress crafted the Act to protect and
enhance the quality o f the N ation’s air resources so as to prom ote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity o f its population.1 The Clean Air Act
enabled federal officials to intervene in interstate air pollution m atters only at the
request o f state governm ents. H ow ever, the mechanisms for enforcing pollution
abatem ent were cum bersom e and unwieldy which rendered them ineffective.
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Between
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1965 and 1970, only eleven abatem ent actions had been initiated under the 1963
Clean A ir A ct.2 C ongress amended the Clean A ir Act by authorizing the A ir Quality
Act o f 1967. This legislation directed the secretary o f the D epartm ent o f H ealth,
Education, and W elfare to establish the Air Quality C ontrol Regions (AQCRs).
W ithin each region, states constructed air quality standards and em ission standards for
regulated pollutants. By 1970, o f the ninety-one designated AQCRs in the country,
only twenty-five had been recognized by the federal governm ent.
These early acts granted state governm ents wide avenue o f discretion with
respect to air pollution control enforcem ent. If state governm ents are granted
deference, the com m on pool nature o f environm ental pollution problem presents a
regulatory dilem m a. W ithout federal guidelines backed by federal enforcem ent for
uniform ity, states have the ability to attract industry by using pollution control, or the
absence o f pollution control, as a selling point to bring industry within their borders.
U nder such circum stances, all states in the region could suffer environm ental set
backs. A state that hopes to limit polluting activities incurs pollution dam age from
their neighbors. A ir pollution does not respect state borders.
The 1970 C lean A ir A ct am endm ents and subsequent amendm ents in 1977 and
1990 represented substantial expansion o f federal involvem ent in air pollution
regulations, especially the com m on pool problem s associated with local control o f air
pollution. The 1970 am endm ents directed the EPA adm inistrator to establish "nation
al am bient air quality standards " (N A A Q S ).1 NAAQS were separated into prim ary
and secondary categories.

Prim ary standards represent "ambient air quality standards
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and attainm ent and m aintenance o f which in the judgem ent o f the adm inistrator, based
on such criteria and allowing an adequate m argin of safety, are requisite to protect the
public health".4 Secondary standards are those necessary to protect the public welfare
from the adverse effects associated with air pollution.
The 1970 act changes required that uniform national standards o f perform ance
be enacted for new stationary sources o f air pollution and for preexisting sources that
were m odified in a m anner that increases the em issions o f any pollutant.

It also

required uniform national standards for "hazardous" air pollutants, defined as "Air
pollution may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in m ortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating irreversible, illness.5
In 1977, am endm ents to the Clean A ir Act divided each type o f AQ CR that
was attaining the standard into class I, class II, and class III. Class I regions include
national parks, wilderness and sim ilar areas. M inute, if any, deterioration in air
quality is allow ed. In class II areas, m oderate increases o f air pollution are allowed
as long as the resulting pollution does not exceed the N A A Q S /’
The 1977 Clean A ir Act am endm ents also provided states develop plans by
1982 that would bring air quality for ozone, carbon m onoxide and other pollutants up
to EPA standards by D ecem ber 31, 1987. Anticipating difficulty in m eeting the
standard m andated in 1977, Congress debated over amendm ents to the Clean A ir Act
to reduce the standards or grant extensions every year from 1981 to 1990.
In 1990, Congress passed and the president signed the 1990 Clean A ir Act
am endm ents. This ended m ore than ten years o f congressional stalemate over the
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reauthorization o f the Clean A ir Act.

During the 1980s, a coalition o f utilities, labor

unions, m idw estern politicians, and auto and oil interests successfully prevented any
strengthening o f the Clean Air A ct.7 President Ronald Reagan and Senate M ajority
Leader Robert Byrd opposed new legislation to control air pollution. The election of
G eorge M itchell o f M aine as m ajority leader, a proponent o f a stronger Clean A ir
Act, and President George Bush led the way to tougher legislation.

A PPLIC A T IO N O F T H E FIV E D ETERM IN A N TS TO T H E C H IE F EX ECU TIV E
R O LE IN T H E CA SE AREA O F B U SH ’S PO LIC Y M A K IN G TO W A RD T H E 1990
C L EA N AIR
ACT

A U THO RITY
A deep-rooted source o f friction between C ongress and the President is control
o f the bureaucracy. For alm ost two centuries, Congress and the president have
com peted with one another for the pow er to regulate the activities o f departm ents and
agencies. Both branches while operating w ithin lim its, have legitim ate claim s.s The
com petition between President Bush and Congress over the execution of the 1990
Clean A ir Act am endm ents was no exception to the pattern o f executive-legislative
friction.
One constitutional approach posits the president is the chief adm inistrative
officer o f a unified and hierarchical executive branch, capable o f directing the
activities and operations o f agency personnel. They serve as the president’s agents in
m aintaining that "the Laws be faithfully executed".

But another approach starts with

75

the prem ise that the C ongress creates the departm ents and may specify how laws are
to be im plem ented. H ierarchical rules are displaced by a system of spreading power
and instituting checks.9 The C onstitution em pow ers Congress to make all laws
"which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers vested
"in the G overnm ent o f the U nited States or in any D epartm ent or O fficer thereof".
Since the C onstitution directs the president to "take care that the Laws be
Faithfully executed," he does have the pow er to utilize the bureaucracy to achieve his
constitutional duties. H ow ever, several attorney generals have advised presidents of
substantial political and legal constraints that limit their ability to intervene in
bureaucratic departm ental m atters.

Even when the president has the pow er to control

the decision o f a departm ental head, such intervention may be inexpedient and of
doubtful p ro p rie ty .10 W hile it is theoretically correct that departm ent heads shall
discharge their adm inistrative duties in such m anner as the president may direct, it
was conceded by Attorney General Edward Bates that it is "quite impossible for the
president to assum e the actual direction of the m ultifarious business o f the depart
m en ts".11
On different occasions an attorney general has advised the president that the
W hite House had no legal right to interfere with adm inistrative decisions.

For

exam ple, President M onroe asked whether he could alter the decisions made by the
auditors and com ptrollers in the Treasury Departm ent. The advice from Attorney
General W illiam W irt was forthright: "It appears to me that you have no power to
in te rfe re ...If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty.
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not only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it
without a violation o f the law, and were the President to perform it, he would not
only be taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating
them h im se lf".12
C ongress may distribute m inisterial functions o f governm ent among various
bureau chiefs and executive officials without regard to hierarchical principles of
public adm inistration.13 Neither the president nor any departm ent head could by any
degree o f laborious industry, revise and correct all the acts of his subordinates. And if
he could, as the law now stands, it would be illegal as unw ise".14
In som e instances, these legal and form al rules do not prevent the president (or
Congress) from interfering with the bureaucracy’s autonom ous duties. Intervention
by presidential aides in rulem aking and adjudication is a subject o f serious co n cern .15
OMB and W hite H ouse efforts may appear like reasonable initiatives to coordinate the
activities o f the executive branch and carry out the president’s program s. But ex
parte contacts by presidential staffers perm it them to gather inform ation privately
from industries o f from state officials to com m unicate such information in closed-door
sessions with agency decision m akers, without the knowledge o f other interested
parties in the rulem aking process.1'’ Responding to this concern, the Justice D epart
ment argued in 1979 that there is no prohibition against com m unication, within the
executive branch after the close o f the com m ent period or proposed rules, provided
that presidential advisers do not serve as a conduit for persons outside the executive
branch to have ex parte com m unications with agency sta ff.17
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The Justice D epartm ent’s guideline relies heavily on self-policing and self
constraint by presidential aides who have a reputation for ignoring procedural
subtleties that stand in the way of W hite House objectives. There exists a strong
tradition - expressed in opinions by attorney generals, statutory language, and
decisions by the federal judiciary - for agency autonom y in adjudication proceedings.
The rulem aking process, while less form ulated and structured than the adjudicatory
m odel, also m ust be conducted in a m anner that observes standards o f openness and
fairness.18
President Bush exercised his authority in such a m anner. Bush successfully
m aneuvered Vice President Dan Q uayle, into a position to interfere with and overrule
agency C lean A ir Act rulemaking and enforcem ent. U nder the guise as chairm an of
the P resident’s Council on Com petiveness, Q uayle and fellow Council m em bers were
able to m anipulate ex parte contacts tow ard suspending and circum venting Clean Air
Act laws. This use o f presidential authority was perverted to achieve W hite House
political objectives.
Q uayle served as the patron saint o f Am erican corporations disturbed with
Clean A ir Act regulation. He aided polluters in undermining regulations by changing
the rules after the Clean Air Act am endm ents w ere made law. According to Repre
sentative Henry W axman (D -C alif.), chair of the House Subcom mittee on Health and
Environm ent, "W hile M r. Bush cultivates the image of the environm ent president, his
vice president is part o f a shadow-governm ent that works behind the scenes to help
polluting industries underm ine the law".
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Republican vice-presidents have acted in such a capacity ever since Ronald
Reagan signed Executive O rder 12291 in 1981, claiming for the W hite House the
power to vet federal regulations for their effect on industrial com petitiveness. Then
Vice President George Bush chaired the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which
boasted am ong its achievements slow ing the phase-out o f lead gasoline.
The sam e was continued by the Council of Com petitiveness, which among its
perm anent m em bers included the secretaries o f Treasury and C om m erce, the Attorney
General, the OM B D irector and the C hief o f Staff. The council’s closed meetings
provided a convivial working atm osphere, free from annoying oversight. W hile the
OMB is prohibited from direct contacts with industry, the Council on Com petitiveness
suffered no such stricture, m aking it a pipeline into the federal regulatory apparatus
for corporate interests.
Thus Q uayle, in his capacity as chairm an o f the council, conferred financial
favors on industry, on a national scale and with decision making authority the
Founding Fathers never anticipated.19 Quayle publicly defined his job as keeping the
United States "num ber one in the global m arkets," but privately he used the post to
com m unicate with secret contacts in industry and to order governm ent agencies to
weaken or toss out regulations that displeased corporate executives.
Q uayle’s pre-em ptive power was so considerable he overrule heads of agencies
like EPA A dm inistrator W illiam Reilly. The sweeping nature of Q uayle's demands
began through a m em orandum he sent to the heads o f agencies and departm ents on
M arch 22, 1991.

He w rote, "At a cabinet m eeting last sum m er. President Bush asked
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the Council on C om petitiveness to oversee the regulatory review process... 1 appreci
ate your help to make sure that [this] process operates to m inim ize the burden on the
econom y of all federal regulations. Henceforth, heads o f agencies were to send his
review ers any "docum ents announcing or implem enting regulatory policy that affects
the public". That m eant not only drafts o f new regulations but also "strategy state
m ents, policy m anuals, grant and loan procedures...press releases".2,1
An April 12, 1991 report prepared by the staff o f OMB W atch (an activist
organization in W ashington D .C . headed by Gary Bass) said that Q uayle’s memo
"caused widespread confusion am ong federal agencies". OM B W atch observed, "The
Quayle Council reserves the right to review [agency policy] - a factor that will
inevitably further politicize agency activities...[T he memo] raise the issue o f whether
the Council intends to take up the role the [Bush] Task Force once played - again
acting as conduit to industry. Council staff have indicated that they hope to solicit
and receive com m ents from those affected by regulatory actions, leaving the door
open for them to court industry and business interests".
From this starting point, the council’s rew orking o f the federal regulatory
apparatus included the following items:
(1)

The council killed a regulation that would have required cities with garbage

incinerators to recycle a quarter of their trash - even though the W hite House had
once touted the rule as the solution to the nation’s solid-waste woes. W hile the EPA
had previously declared that the regulation "would pass any imaginable cost/benefit
test", the incinerator industry found it burdensom e, and so did the council.
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(2)

The council suggested m ore than a hundred changes to the 1990 Clean Air

Act, none o f which would strengthen it. M ore potentially dam aging, was a proposed
loophole (phrased as a m inor perm it amendm ent) that would allow companies to set
their own m axim um pollution levels. Should state governm ents fail to object to a
com pany’s dream lim its w ithin seven days, the perm its would autom atically be
revised to suit the polluter’s fancy.
Rep. W axm an criticized the council’s actions. H e observed: "Not only is this
horrible policy, it is also flagrantly illegal". He believed Bush should have vetoed the
Clean A ir Act if he wanted to.

"But once enacted into the law, he does not have the

authority to revise or alter the legislation. N or, needless to say does his vice-presi
d e n t".21
In its efforts to elim inate governm ent imposed burdens on scientific and
technological progress and to protect private property rights from unwarranted
governm ent interference, the council ad made itself a final court o f appeals for
polluters.

DECISIO N M AKING
The decision m aking determ inant assesses Bush’s ability to deal with other
political actors in the carrying out o f Clean A ir Act provisions. The 1990 Clean A ir
Act am endm ents required cooperation from Congress, the bureaucracy and subnatio
nal elites like state governors and legislators. M oreover the role interest groups
played in the execution o f the A ct’s provisions will be addressed.

In this way we can
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assess w hether Bush achieved the policy goals o f the act through the decision making
process.
Bush’s approach to C ongress was to simply bypass it. This ability stemmed
from his use and abuse o f presidential authority in authorizing the Council on
Com petitiveness to oversee the regulatory execution o f the act’s provisions. Congress
viewed this shift in policy im plem entation as illegal. Henry W axm an (D -C a.),
Chairm an o f the House Subcom m ittee on Health and the Environm ent, expressed this
sentim ent during the com m ittee’s hearings. No law gave the council the right to veto
or undercut a pollution control program m andated by Congress; there was no C on
gressional oversight o f his council and no way o f knowing what transpired in the
council’s com m unications with the regulated com panies. Chairm an Quayle even re
fused to send a representative to testify at the W axm an hearings on the council. The
only legal rationale for the operation was contained in two executive orders signed by
President Reagan in 1981 and 1985. The purpose o f these orders, as stated in the
pream ble was to "insure w ell-reasoned regulations".22 A Library o f Congress study
concluded after Reagan signed the first order that he had exceeded his authority in
signing it.
Governm ent back-room collaboration with regulated com panies now seemed to
be fully institutionalized in spite o f efforts o f Congress to control it. The influence of
regulated com panies was self-evident in the decision making process. For instance.
Congress, seeing the failure o f earlier clean air efforts, adopted a different approach
in 1990, telling EPA to set standards that already have the best pollution-control
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technology. The law orders EPA to regulate 189 specific air tonics by source, and
requires the states to step in with their own rules if EPA is late, a scenario industry
would oppose.
The new rule would have cut hazardous air emissions by chemical and other
factories alm ost in half. A ccording to the EPA this was supposed to have been final
by Novem ber 1992. But by August 1992, the OMB had slated the draft for eight
m onths. Since it had not been issued for public com m ent, EPA could not m ake the
deadline. The OM B draft would have covered m ost big polluters in the chemical
industry, including divisions o f m any m ajor oil com panies.
A num ber o f these com panies and their top executives were among the top 100
contributors to R epublican presidential cam paigns: Atlantic Richfield (topping out at
$862,000), Occidental Petroleum , Coastal Corp. and Am erican Petrofina. O thers had
becom e big Republican donors since 1988; Chevron and one of its top lobbyists have
given $272,000 since Bush took office. O verall, those companies with a direct stake
in the conflict over air toxins had given more than $3.2 m illion to the Republican
Party between the 1988 and 1992 elections.
The affected industries were concerned about the precedent the rule would set
as the first m ajor air tonics regulation. The Chem ical M anufacturers Association
(CM A ), the A m erican Petroleum Institute (A PI), and individual companies im m edi
ately began lobbying the EPA and OMB. Some, including representatives o f Chevron
and A ir Products and C hem icals, had met with EPA staff.
The council was believed to have influenced OMB in shuttling the rule.

API
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and others had m entioned the rule in com m ents on regulatory burdens they confront.
In June 1992, after a protracted squabble betw een the council and EPA , Bush agreed
with the council that another Clean A ir Act rule should allow factories to increase
their em issions above perm it levels without notifying the public. M any o f the same
corporations that lobbied the W hite House during that debate are also seeking to shape
the air tonics rule.
"We think [cost considerations] is a com plete perversion o f the statute and our
general counsel has told [OMB] that a couple o f tim es," observed one EPA source
involved in the process.23
State governm ents also played an instrum ental role in the derailing o f EPA
execution o f the act’s m andates. As noted previously, Congress gave the EPA two
years to issue technical and legal regulations covering a host o f em issions in order to
initiate the cleanup process.

E PA ’s regulations would then guide states as they create

plans to reach em ission targets. Congress initially appropriated $400 m illion for the
act, earm arking $137 m illion for EPA to give to states as grants.
The state im plem entation plans are "the heart o f the new Clean A ir A ct...the
linchpin on which the whole act rests, " says Deborah Sheiman, resource specialist at
the National Resources Defense Council (N R D C ).24 How ever states have a great
deal of freedom to interpret the federal regulations in preparing the plans, and that
may have opened the way for tight state budgets and special-interest lobbyists to
sidetrack the a c t’s designs.
For exam ple, coal-producing Ohio, a state with heavy m anufacturing, a
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Republican governor in 1991 who was the bane o f environm entalists, and a coal-based
electric utility industry, successfully sidetracked the act’s designs.

F orm er Ohio

Environm ental Council director Steve Sedam thought the motto of the state EPA was
to "work with polluters" to reduce fines and ease compliance rather than impose fines
or develop strict com pliance procedures.25
Like several states, Ohio faced a severe budget shortfall. As a result the
general assem bly had proposed to cut the Ohio EPA budget 25 percent just as its
Clean A ir plans were coming due. At the same tim e, Ohio utilities were lobbying for
a 135-day lim it on the time the state could take to review the perm its for solid waste
generated by scrubbers. This limit would overburden an understaffed EPA . As a
result Ohio cut corners in implementing the Clean A ir Act, som ething C ongress did
not plan.
Finally, the E P A itself was ham pered by the resources allocated to itself by
Congress and Bush. Acting on the will o f Congress was challenging because o f the
time proven m axim , "You get what you pay fo r” .
An estim ated 2,200 EPA em ployees work at least part-time on various aspects
of the act, the quantity o f new regulations and technical analyses threaten to over
whelm staff, m any o f whom arrived at the agency as a result o f the 1990 am end
ments. For instance, the acid-rain division did not exist before N ovem ber 1990. Yet
states were supposed to cut sulfur-dioxide emissions 40 percent from their 1980 level
by the year 2000, and Congress gave the division’s 30-plus staff m em bers only until
Septem ber 1991 to propose ways to achieve the goals.
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EX PERTISE
H ow Bush relied on his advisors (and the inform ation he received from them)
can provide insight as to why the policy ends o f the Clean A ir Act w ent unfulfilled.
The authority determ inant revealed how Bush utilized nonlegal executive devices to
sabotage bureaucratic and Congressional efforts to secure the acts’ aim s. Both the
authority and decision making determ inants illustrated how Bush pushed his political
goals over environm ental and health objectives. The expertise determ inant will
dem onstrate how his advisors treated data and interacted with each other in producing
the anti-environm ental policy.
Bush designed the Council o f Com petitiveness to achieve the policy ends he
believed necessary for his political survival - reelection in the 1992 presidential
cam paign. The original council alone showed the im portance Bush attached to it:
Chairm an Dan Quayle, Vice President; John Sununu, W hite House C h ief o f Staff;
Dick T hornburgh, A ttorney G eneral; Nicholas Brady, Secretary o f Treasury; Michael
Boskin, Council o f Econom ic Advisers C hair Richard D arm an, OM B Director;
Robert M osbacher, Secretary o f Com m erce.
M oreover, a key m em ber in the council’s deregulation schem e was C. Boyden
G ray, presidential counsel to Bush. Gray headed a Quayle working group on
regulatory policy. G ray’s W hite H ouse/industry connections go back to the early
1980s, when he was counsel to the Reagan deregulation task force. At that time Gray
developed a hit list o f regulations destined for oblivion in what became known in
W ashington as the "black hole".

He was instrumental in siding with industry in
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Clean Air disputes and refused to provide information on the council’s actions to the
Congress or the press.
The council overruled EPA Clean Air implem entation efforts. One o f the
m ajor disputes betw een W illiam Reilly, the EPA chief, and the council was decided in
the councils’ favor by Bush since he decided to endorse the council’s actions,
blocking Clean A ir Act rules that would have required businesses with pollution
perm its to submit to public hearings before increasing their em issions.
Reilly argued citizens must have the chance to challenge any changes contem 
plated by industry, indeed the act m akes it a legal requirem ent. The Council dis
agreed, and its w ord was final. The defeat for citizen participation in enforcing
environm ental policy was serious. Reilly and the vice president m ade the issue a test
o f wills, and Reilly lost - because o f the president.2f1
Quayle and the council w ere not qualified to evaluate or revise these sorts o f
regulations, a task that requires expert knowledge o f pollution-control technology and
the effects o f pollution on the hum an body. Neither were the staff at the O M B ’s
Office o f Inform ation and Regulatory Affairs, who reviewed the regulations for
Quayle and whose specialties were in such areas as econom ics, public adm inistration
and law. Quayle and his council relied on the environm ental perspectives of industr
y ’s experts.27

PUBLIC INPUTS
Public opinion did play an important role in Bush’s approach to the Clean Air
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Act. Both Bush’s support for the act’s amendm ents in 1990 and his subsequent
efforts in 1991 and 1992 at derailing the am endm ents w ere politically m otivated at
gaining public support and reflecting public opinion. W hat distinguished his 1990
perform ance from his 1991 and 1992 efforts was that Bush and his advisors gauged
public opinion better in 1990 than in the latter years. Bush believed assum ing a pro
business stance and an aloofness toward environm ental issues would im prove his
chances for reelection in 1992.

H ow ever, the results o f the 1992 election proved

Bush’s calculation wrong.
In 1990 Bush recognized public opinion supported tougher environm ental laws
in order to meet environm ental problem s. Bush and many lawmakers had invested
substantial political capital in their environm ental records.28 And in an election year,
no one wanted to face the voters em pty-handed. Thus the 1990 Clean air A ct’s
passage could be attributed to broad public support for addressing environm ental
problem s.
Beginning in 1991, Bush did an about face and started the process of eroding
the a c t’s provisions.

In part he did this in the belief that this form o f deregulation

w ould spur the economy out o f the ongoing recession. Also he needed to shore up
his support among conservatives and business groups angry at his "No new taxes
reversal at the 1990 budget sum m it. This culm inated in the 1992 campaign strategy
to portray the Clinton-G ore team as an eco-driven ticket hostile to business and
potentially harmful to the overall economy. Bush and Quayle wanted to paint
them selves as business-friendly and better able to handle the economy.

Environm en-

tal issues would have to take a backseat to other pressing issues.
Bush relied on his advisors in adopting this policy and cam paign approach.
U nfortunately for him, the public was not receptive to his message. Public opinion
still indicated support for an im proved environm ent even during periods o f anemic
econom ic grow th.
environm ent.

M oreover, the public did not perceive Bush as reliable on the
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CRISIS

Enforcem ent o f the 1990 Clean A ir Act did not constitute a crisis situation, at
least in the conventional sense o f the term - a national em ergency was not at hand.
This does not deny some supporters o f the Clean A ir Act view current air pollution
levels as a crisis situation. H ow ever, it is difficult to conclude w hether an air
pollution crisis exists and if it does, is it a short-term or long-term one, and is it
possible to decouple the short-term implications from the long-term im plications, etc.
Regardless o f the scientific com m unity’s consensus and public opinion toward air
pollution, Bush did not see enforcem ent o f the act’s provisions as a crisis type
situation.
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CHAPTER FOUR

C O N C L U S IO N

Through com paring and contrasting the chief diplom atic role and the chief
executive role it becomes self-evident that President Bush did not achieve his policy
aims in the environm ental area. This analysis will be conducted on the level o f each
o f the determ inants.

A U TH O R ITY
W ithin both roles Bush utilized his authority for political ends and not environ
mental policy ends. W hen Bush perform ed the chief diplomatic role at the Rio
conference he took full advantage o f the authority invested in him to m ake treaty
obligations. He refused to sign any o f the original versions o f the pacts negotiated
despite international and dom estic pressure to do so. Unless the pact contained
provisions that he believed did not interfere with his political survival, he did not
exercise his authority toward com m itting to such an agreement.
Likewise Bush did not exercise the authority invested in him to execute the
Clean A ir Act revisions. He was able to succeed in this endeavor for a few basic
reasons.

First, the constitutional provisions to "execute" laws perm its any president

some latitude in how to carry through the project o f executing. Until a court decision
or a revision in the affected legislation "checks" the president in this regard, he is
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able to pick and choose how to enforce the law. This aspect o f authority leads to
another reason why Bush was able to exercise presidential authority to his perceived
political advantage - neither Congress nor the courts had the authority to call Bush on
his possible Clean A ir Act circum ventions before he lost his re-election bid in
N ovem ber 1992. This turn o f events rendered m oot whether the Council of Com peti
tiveness engaged in unconstitutional acts or if the existence o f Council itself was
extra-constitutional.

Bush did take advantage o f the "quasi-custom" of creating

presidential councils to achieve the political goals o f the executive branch that could
not be obtained through other political and constitutional means. This recent develop
m ent has expanded presidential authority and has yet to be successfully challenged by
the other branches or other political actors.
Thus Bush utilized presidential authority for political ends when it came to
environm ental policy. Environm ental policy ends were only sought when it was
deemed politically expedient - in other words when they coincided with political
objectives.

D ECISIO N M AKING
B ush’s decision making in term s o f environm ental policy ranged from devious
to m ercurial. Both roles revealed a stark contrast in how Bush decided his adm inistr
ation’s approach toward the environm ent would be. W ithin the chief executive role
Bush strived to be subtle and surreptitious in his approval o f Clean A ir Act circum 
vention. On the other hand, within the chief diplom atic role, he made decisions in a

defensive and reactive m anner. He sought to appease his conservative critics and
supporters o f the Rio environm ental agenda but ended up appeasing neither.
Bush, in effect, em ployed a good cop-bad cop stratagem to underm ine the
Clean A ir Act provisions he had supported earlier. He hoped to stage Quayle as the
bad cop and him self the good cop. In order to execute this plan he assigned Quayle
the same role he assum ed when he was Vice President - chairm an o f a presidentialcreated council designed to achieve executive political goals which were not obtain
able through established constitutional, bureaucratic and political m eans. Quayle
would directly oversee the usurpation of the A ct’s intent under the guise o f cham pion
ing the business and econom ic interests o f the nation. W hile Quayle perform ed this
task, Bush could stand on the sideline and project some reasonable sem blance for
concern about the environm ent. His actions and the evidence at hand indicate he
wanted to claim credit for the 1990 Clean A ir Act provisions in order to prove his
environm ental credentials to his skeptics, but also dism antle key Act provisions in
order to sustain the support o f conservatives and m ajor contributors. The actual
political outcom e was m ixed.
Bush’s gam bit to secure conservative support did achieve some success. He
was able to capture the conservative vote in the 1992 election and renew even better
contribution levels com pared to his 1988 cam paign. Nevertheless he lost the election.
A whole host o f factors contributed to his election defeat and one policy area Bush
received a significant negative rating was the environm ent. His policy m aneuvers did
not ring true in the eyes o f the public and Congress.
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As President, he had to assume
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responsibility for the C ouncils’s actions. His attem pt at schizophrenic policym aking
did not succeed.
W hile Bush was at least determ ined to retract his Clean A ir com m itm ents, he
proved indecisive and vacuous in his decision making within the chief diplom atic role
toward the Rio conference. The perform ance was a notable departure from the chief
executive who crafted a subtle effort to walk the Clean A ir tightrope and a polar
opposite from the chief diplom at who displayed exceptional decision m aking capabili
ties in assem bling international, congressional, and public support behind the Persian
G ulf W ar effort. D uring the Persian G ulf conflict Bush initiated the effort, executed
it, and fulfilled his policy objectives. In contradistinction, Bush was led by the
public, C ongress, and other international leaders into participating at the summ it. His
resistance to attending stem m ed from conflicting staff advice and his cam paign team ’s
m isunderstanding o f public sentim ent toward the conference. Needless to say, Bush
conditioned his participation on securing varying treaty concessions in order to
achieve what he deemed w ere vital political assets for winning re-election. So,
through crude political m eans. Bush actually employed his decision m aking capacity
to achieve dubious policy ends - a pyrrhic victory. Thus Bush’s decision making
reflected alm ost exclusive concern for political self-preservation and not environm en
tal policy ends.
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EX PERTISE
This determ inant is intrinsically closely connected to the decision making
determ inant, and in the case o f Bush’s environm ental policy m aking a virtual m irror.
In both roles, the expertise determ inant proved a vital factor in the outcom es o f his
environm ental policy decisions.
W ithin the chief executive role, Bush relied heavily on Q uayle’s Council to
handle the detail work o f using dubious legal m eans to spark the econom y and rescue
his fading re-election hopes. The C ouncil’s strategy included gutting the Clean Air
Act to both renew key business support and calculating environm ental relief burden
would help drive econom ic recovery.

Bush was deft at elevating Q uayle’s policy

recom m endations over R eilly’s.
In juxtaposition, Bush’s inability to comm and leadership at the Rio conference
reflected the deep divisions w ithin his staff. He was genuinely at a loss whether to
heed Scow croft’s advice vis-a-vis Q uayle’s. In this situation expertise broke down on
him.

PU BLIC INPUTS
Public inputs influenced the two roles differently. Bush and his team did not
know how to respond to public opinion to their advantage. They knew the reversal
on the Clean A ir Act prom ulgation would antagonize the general public and attempted
to shield Bush from the about face and also redefine the actions as necessary for
aiding econom ic recovery.

This strategy was an attempt to redirect public opinion.
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This approach was also adopted for the Rio conference.

Public opinion

favored United States participation in the conference and support for the conference’s
agenda. Again Bush and his advisors believed his re-election hinged on em phasizing
econom ic recovery over a m eaningful environm ental program . Thus he attended the
conference after gaining concessions that rendered m ajor portions o f the varying pacts
weak. His attendance, in part, was a sop to public opinion but his perform ance did
not convince the electorate his efforts were sincere. The Bush team miscalculated
assuming a recalcitrant stance would shift public opinion to Bush’s advantage in the
re-election effort. Thus Bush was never able to get a handle on how to respond to
public inputs or redirect public opinion to his advantage.

CRISIS
Bush’s perform ance w ithin both roles and cases reveal he did not view
environm ental policy as addressing a crisis situation. N or did he define the imm edi
ate and future condition o f the environm ent as a crisis and rally support behind an
executive initiative to m eet such a challenge. That kind o f effort may have shored up
public opinion to his favor.

Relying on staff advice, he instead attempted to defuse

concern about the current status o f the environm ent and its future. This approach
backfired and hurt his credibility on environm ental issues.

This investigation indicates Bush was ineffective in both defining the goals of
his adm inistration’s environm ental policy and utilizing the tools necessary for

fulfilling such policy goals. He did not reconcile him self to the public positions he
forwarded with his political ambitions. As a result, substantive environm ental
progress was stalled but, ironically, his political am bitions were frustrated.
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